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STATUTORY RHETORIC: THE REALITY




Despite the rehabilitative purpose that the juvenile justice
system was originally created to achieve,' there no longer exists a
. Brooklyn Law School Class of 1997; Fordham University, B.A., 1993. The
author wishes to thank Brooklyn Law School Professor Cynthia Dachowitz for
her guidance in the preparation of this Note. The author also wishes to extend
a special thanks to Matthew S. Kitz and to her family for their continual support
and encouragement.
' "Juvenilejustice system" is defined as an "amalgamationof... institutions
and activities which are used by our society to cope with the child who is at risk
or who poses a risk." Don McCorkell, Jr., The Politics of Juvenile Justice in
America, in FROM CHILDREN TO CITzENs 22 (Francis X. Hartmann ed., 1987).
"The American juvenile justice system exists within all states by statute. Each
jurisdiction has a juvenile code and a special court structure to deal with children
in trouble." LARRY J. SIEGEL & JOSEPH J. SENNA, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY:
THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 275 (1981). The juvenile justice system in the
United States embodies "between 10,000 and 20,000 public and private agencies,
with a total budget amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars." Id.
The term "system," when referring to the juvenile justice system, does not
contemplate a unified coalition of child advocates with a "formal structure and
clearly stated goals." Id. The various elements of the juvenile justice system are
"not so coordinated that they operate in unison;" rather, they bear little more than
a marginally influential relationship to each other. Id.
In fact, many juvenile justice agencies compete for budgetary support,
espouse different philosophies, and have personnel standards that differ
significantly. It would be useful for all the agencies concerned with
juvenile justice to be an integrated system. . . . However, most
program decisions are made without proper planning information or
objective data, and effective evaluation is a rarity in the juvenile justice
field. Consequently, the vast majority of states operate fragmented and
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common design in America's juvenile justice system. Different
philosophies on how the juvenile justice system should handle
serious juvenile offenders appear throughout the United States.2
The statutory language of each state's juvenile justice code
basically represents a "piecemeal approximation of a legislature's
intent.",3 The competing interests of enforcing the rehabilitative
ideal upon which the juvenile justice system was created, and of
administering punishment to protect society from delinquent
children, present a nationwide dilemma.4
generally uncoordinated juvenile justice systems.
Id. at 275-76.
The founders of the juvenile court system sought to further the rehabilitation
of youthful offenders. Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 281 (1967), reprinted in JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY 256
(Frederic J. Fraust & Paul J. Brantingham eds., 1974). "The juvenile court is
theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the child and of society rather
than adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of
guidance and rehabilitation . . . not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and
punishment." Id. at 256 n.4 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554
(1966)).
2 Jeffrey L. Bleich, Legislative Trends, in FROM CHILDREN TO CITIZENS,
supra note 1, at 31, 31.
3Id.
4 Today, the juvenile court system throughout the United States is
experiencing an "identity crisis." Mark Curriden, Juvenile Justice: Hard Times
for Bad Kids, 81 A.B.A. J. 66, 67 (1995) (quoting Barry Feld, professor of law,
University of Minnesota). Responding to the perceived increase in serious crime,
Professor Feld, an advocate of abolishing the juvenile court system, noted:
[The juvenile court system] was originally intended to be a social
welfare system. It was supposed to identify needs and point the child
or the family to the appropriate service. Today, it is little more than a
scaled-down, second-class criminal court.... The system was never
designed to handle the serious criminal matters coming before it now.
Id; see Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 691, 715 (1991) (advocating the abolishment of the juvenile court system).
However, statistics show that when the "get-tough era" began in the 1970s,
youth crime remained relatively stable-it was not on the rise as most of society
believed it to be. Curriden, supra, at 67; see infra note 23 (defining "get-tough
era"). The decade spanning the late 1970s to the late 1980s saw the incarceration
rate of juveniles increase approximately 50% in response to the growing get-
tough era, while the crime rate of youths 18-years-old and younger actually
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The fact that the juvenile justice system addresses various
competing interests5 tends to explain the ambiguity and confusion
apparent within most juvenile justice legislation. Generally, a state
may have to forego one interest in order to obtain another. While
every state may wish to ideally reconcile all competing interests,
each is ultimately "forced to make choices regarding the emphasis
and preference [to] attach to each value" and arrive at a "balance
that reflects [each] legislature's sense of social priorities."6 As a
result, the resoundingly similar juvenile justice codes throughout
the United States have translated into profoundly different juvenile
justice practices.7
Inferences may be drawn according to how each state ranks the
competing objectives of its juvenile justice agenda.' The "due
decreased approximately 20%. Curriden, supra, at 67. Such statistics thereby
suggest that most of the stringent reforms beginning in the 1970s and continuing
through today were not necessary, and may have even exacerbated the juvenile
crime problem.
5 The competing interests which the juvenile justice system must acknowl-
edge are: (1) children are not as fully developed as adults, both physically and
mentally, and they require "guidance and protection to aid in their proper
development;" (2) society deserves protection from criminal activity, even if
committed by ajuvenile; and (3) the "integrity of the family." Bleich, supra note
2, at 32.
6 Bleich, supra note 2, at 32. The values held by society represent a
recurring theme that plays a major role in determining public policy in the area
ofjuvenile justice. McCorkell, supra note 1, at 23. Courts and policymakers must
create a supervisory system that assures society that the services and state
programs allegedly created to rehabilitate delinquent children are not simply
"new versions of control without adequate due process protections for the rights
of the [child]." McCorkell, supra note 1, at 26. At a minimum, states that
articulate the importance of family preservation as a fundamental principle
through statutory language have created a foundation that protects families from
the excessive use of state intervention and the punitive removal of children from
their homes. McCorkell, supra note 1, at 26; see, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6301(b)(1) (1982) (providing for the preservation and unity of the family
whenever possible as one of the primary goals of its Juvenile Act).
7 Bleich, supra note 2, at 32.
Bleich, supra note 2, at 32. Absent an in-depth examination of state
legislative debates and reports, deriving legislative intent through statutory
inferences may seem rudimentary. However, "legislatures have clearly expressed
their intent by consciously altering" the rank they attribute to their competing
225
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process revolution,"9 however, has spurred several jurisdictions to
"abandon specific references to statutory goals or objectives" by
focusing primarily on the procedural requirements of their juvenile
justice laws.'" While a few states include a comprehensive list of
statutory objectives within the preambles to their juvenile laws,"
it is important to discern that statutory goals are generally para-
digmatic guidelines, not substantive directives that juvenile courts
are bound to utilize.
juvenile justice objectives. Bleich, supra note 2, at 32; see Barry C. Feld, The
Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the
Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REv. 821, 841 (1988) (acknowledging that
analysis of the purpose clause of a state'sjuvenile justice laws sheds light on the
direction that state's juvenile court intends to follow with respect to juvenile
offenders). For examples of ways different states have ranked the competing
objectives of their juvenile justice systems, see infra Part I and accompanying
notes.
9 See generally Bleich, supra note 2, at 37. The "due process revolution" has
been characterized by landmark judicial decisions holding that juveniles are
entitled to a wide range of procedural safeguards that were previously denied to
them. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970) (holding that proof beyond
a reasonable doubt applies to juveniles charged with violation of criminal law
because it is necessary to protect the innocent-until-proven-guilty juvenile); In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55-56 (1967) (recognizing that because adolescents in
juvenile court are faced with prospects of harsh punishment, they are entitled to
the same due process protections afforded adults including the right to be
represented by counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the
right to adequate notice of charges, the right to invoke privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to appeal); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-
54 (1966) (holding that juveniles have a right to a hearing before being
transferred or waived to the adult criminal court system and to a statement of
reasons by the court supporting such a decision to waive jurisdiction to the adult
court).
10 Bleich, supra note 2, at 37. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.10.010-.142
(1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-201 to -251 (1989 & Supp. 1995); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-1 to -74 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, §§ 1001-1011 (Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2301 to-2339 (1989
& Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT. §§ 14-6-201 to -308 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
" See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-1.1 (1995) (setting forth a list of eight
goals); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-1-1.1 (Bums 1987 & Supp. 1996) (setting forth
a list of 11 goals). Unfortunately, such an all-inclusive approach, while
commendable, is highly contradictory and serves to provide little more than lip
service to certain objectives.
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Part I of this Note will examine the recurring and primary
statutory purposes of the states' juvenile justice systems. Section A
will discuss and set forth examples of the brusque legislative
measures states have taken with regard to the statutory preamble of
their juvenile justice system. Section B will discuss and propound
examples of those jurisdictions that intend to satisfy the competing
statutory goals of serving both the best interests of the child and the
protection of the public. Section B will also briefly review those
states that have adhered, at least by virtue of statute, to the
traditional notions of the rehabilitation of child offenders, as well
as those states that have succumbed to the recent punitive charge
on juvenile offenders. Section C will examine alternative statutory
goals that primarily serve to rehabilitate the child while recognizing
a limited form of discipline commensurate with the unique
circumstances of the individual child.
Part II of this Note will evaluate the reality of the various
juvenile justice statutory goals in view of the judicial treatment and
interpretation given to such laws. Part II will also address the intent
of the juvenile justice system, as derived from case law, of states
that do not set forth express statutory preambles to their juvenile
laws. Part III will further evaluate the substance of such statutory
goals vis-a-vis subsequent statutory provisions that facilitate the
transfer of certain serious juvenile offenders for adjudication to the
punitive adult criminal justice system. This Note concludes that the
majority of states are torn between the desire to rehabilitate
wayward children and the perceived notion that society desires
juvenile offenders to be tried as adults. As a result, the enumerated
statutory goals of a particular state's juvenile justice system are not
wholly determinative of the type of disposition a juvenile offender
will receive. Despite the recent punitive trend within the juvenile
justice system, this Note advocates that states are capable of
creating an effective rehabilitative juvenile justice system that
uniformly reflects both statute and case law.
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I. STATUTORY PREAMBLES
A. Changing Priorities
America fears its youth' 2 -but its fear is not wholly justi-
fied. 3 Societal fear is a misconception that needs correction so
that the rehabilitative approach to juvenile justice may once again
gain public support and practice. 4 Evidence suggests that children
" See generally Ira M. Schwartz et al., Public Attitudes Toward Juvenile
Crime and Juvenile Justice: Implications for Public Policy, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB.
L. & POL'Y 241 (1992) (analyzing findings from a national survey on public
attitudes toward juvenile crime). "One of the most interesting findings is that
punitive attitudes towards juvenile offenders are significantly related to the fear
of being victimized by a violent crime." Id at 241.
"3 See generally Roger J.R. Levesque & Alan J. Tomkins, Revisioning
Juvenile Justice: Implications of the New Child Protection Movement, 48 WASH.
U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 87, 87 & nn.1-5 (1995) (revealing that "mounting
evidence ... disputes the premise that juvenile crime is proliferating").
The best evidence contradicts a popular belief that juvenile crime is
exploding. Not only has juvenile crime not risen for the past two
decades, but several indicators suggest that the rate of juvenile crime
has actually declined. Over the past decade, the total percentage of
juvenile arrests has dropped, including arrests for serious crimes.
Id at 87 & n.7 (noting that serious crimes committed by juveniles have declined
at a rate of two percent between 1982 and 1992).
" See Fox Butterfield, After a Decade, Juvenile Crime Begins to Drop, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 9, 1996, at AI (according to Attorney General Janet Reno, "the
nationwide rate of juvenile violent crime fell slightly last year for the first time
in almost a decade, and the rate of homicide by juveniles decreased for the
second year in a row, down by 15.2 percent"). The source of justification behind
the tougher treatment of serious juvenile offenders is the public perception that
violent crime by such young offenders is on the rise and propounds a great threat
to public safety. Leslie Fraust & Phil Sudo, What Kind of Justice? Should
Violent Young Offenders Be Getting Stiffer Punishment?, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE,
Apr. 5, 1991, at 10; see Levesque & Tomkins, supra note 13, at 87 (contradic-
ting the belief that juvenile crime is on the rise). Vindicators of the recent get-
tough premise argue that "the rehabilitative approach allows violent young
offenders to slip through the system with little more than a slap on the wrist."
Id However, the public -fear of juvenile offenders that sparked the get-tough era
can partly be attributed to the ultra-sensationalized reports of critics of the
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rehabilitative ideal. See generally Randall Shelden, Save the Children, POL'Y
REV., Spring 1986, at 93 (providing an example of a juvenile justice critic who
"resorted to a gross exaggeration of juvenile crime statistics" to inflame the
public). Politicians and anti-crime advocates are not the only source of the
public's confusion and lack of understanding in this area; the public is also
sometimes misled by the media. RICHARD J. LUNDMAN, PREVENTION AND
CONTROL OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 4-5 (2d ed. 1993); IRA M. SCHWARTZ,
(IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: RETHINKING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
65-84 (1989). See generally Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A
Case Study of Juvenile Justice, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 984-85 (1995) (stating
that "the intensity and tenor of youth crime [media] coverage inevitably colors
both people's perceptions of reality and politicians' reactions"); Gary Enos,
Troubled Youths; States Throw Away the Key on Most Kids, CITY & STATE, Apr.
26-May 9, 1993, at 9 (noting that publicity surrounding juvenile crimes
exacerbates the crime and leads the public to believe that violent youth crime is
out of control); George Pettinico, Crime and Punishment: America Changes Its
Mind, PUB. PERSP., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 29 (according to a poll taken in 1993
published by the Roper Center for public opinion research, 65% of Americans
base their conclusion that crime is on the rise on what they hear and read in the
media, as opposed to real life experiences); Rorie Sherman, Juvenile Justice: A
System at Odds Over Punishment, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25, 1991, at 1 (noting there
is "increased publicity" given to juveniles who commit violent crimes).
For example, Paul J. McNulty, the president of a Washington-based anti-
crime advocate group known as the First Freedom Coalition, professed that "the
greatest danger lies ahead . . . America faces the most violent juvenile crime
surge in history." Paul J. McNulty, Natural Born Killers?, POL'Y REV., Winter
1995, at 84. McNulty further declared that "[t]he warnings of this coming storm
are unmistakable.. . . and we are in for a catastrophe in the early 21st century."
Id. It is inflammatory rhetoric such as this that prompts the public to lobby for
the incarceration of juvenile offenders rather than rehabilitation. Unfortunately,
incarceration is a short-term response to a long-term problem.
Incarceration ofjuveniles for the purpose of punishment does not effectively
deter juvenile crime. For example, California's get-tough tactics have had
"virtually no effect on deterring juvenile crime," despite the magnitude of
incarcerated juvenile offenders in that state. Fraust & Sudo, supra, at 10.
According to a 1989 study by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
with respect to California, 70% of the juveniles who spent over a year in a state
institution were again arrested after their release, and 62% of those juveniles
were reincarcerated. Fraust & Sudo, supra, at 10. Approximately 83% of serious
crimes in the United States are committed by only five percent of the nation's
youth. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL
REPORT 50 (1995) [hereinafter OJJDP REPORT]; see Donna M. Hamparian et al.,
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who both discover crime at a young age and who commit progres-
sively serious crimes are more predisposed to engage in criminal
activity as adults. 5 "The probability that an individual who was
never arrested as a juvenile will become a chronic offender as an
adult is extremely remote." '16 It is therefore imperative that serious
juvenile offenders receive effective rehabilitative treatment in order
The Young Criminal Years of the Violent Few, in YOUNG BLOOD 105, 108-09
(Shirley Dicks ed., 1995) (finding through the results of a cohort study of violent
juvenile offenders that "[a] relatively small number of violent juvenile offenders
were responsible for most of the arrests"). Authorities on juvenile justice have
reported that a "stint in jail tends to make [teenagers] more violent." Lauren
Tarshis, What Makes Teens Violent?, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Feb. 11, 1994, at 10.
Jailed children must respond to the "culture of violence" existing in prisons in
order to survive their period of incarceration. Id. As a result, many teenagers
carry this learned violent prison culture into society when they are released. Id.
Violent juvenile offenders who receive intensive rehabilitative treatment
from a trained staff at an early stage tend to evince positive responses to such
treatment. Id. Therefore, rehabilitation efforts that focus on this small group of
chronic offenders will serve to maximize crime reduction rates. See Shelden,
supra, at 93 (stating that "[c]oncentrating our efforts at the small number of
'chronic' delinquents is certainly a worthwhile goal"). Although appealing on the
surface, it will be difficult to implement such a program because it is not easy
to identify which juvenile offender will ultimately become a chronic offender.
For "we must never forget that even the most hardened juvenile delinquents were
at one time mere toddlers. Somewhere, someone, or some institution has failed."
Shelden, supra, at 93. Therefore, relegating serious juvenile offenders to jail will
certainly prevent them from committing crimes while incarcerated, but it will not
effectively deter them from committing more serious crimes in the future when
they are once again released into society. Shelden, supra, at 93.
"s See generally Peter W. Greenwood, Care and Discipline: Their
Contribution to Delinquency and Regulation by the Juvenile Court, in FROM
CHILDREN TO CITIZENS, supra note 1, at 80, 81 (noting that studies have
revealed a "strong correlation between juvenile and adult arrests"); see also
OJJDP REPORT, supra note 14, at 50-51 (finding that the earlier a youth commits
a serious crime, the more likely the youth is to continue this behavior as an
adult). The National Youth Survey found that 45% of the juveniles initiating
serious violent offending before age 11 continued to commit violent acts into
their twenties, as compared to 25% of those who committed their first serious
offense at age 12, and the even lower percentage of those who started in their
teens. OJJDP REPORT, supra note 14, at 50-51.
16 Greenwood, supra note 15, at 86.
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to decrease their odds of becoming adult offenders.' 7 Unfortu-
nately, the shift toward the punishment of the child, as opposed to
rehabilitation, hinders the juvenile justice system from providing
effective treatment to serious juvenile offenders.
As exemplified by the developments patterned by the Illinois
legislature, the harbinger of the juvenile justice system, 8 over the
" Juvenile offenders must receive effective rehabilitative treatment.
However, given the breadth of governmental entities sharing the responsibility
for juvenile justice in America, "it is difficult to discuss the politics of juvenile
justice without tending towards oversimplification." McCorkell, supra note 1, at
22. State legislatures are faced with cumbersome timetables and financial
problems thereby making it formidable to get juvenile justice issues "high
enough on the agenda" for serious debate. McCorkell, supra note 1, at 23.
" The passage of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 both established
the nation's first juvenile court and launchedthe "contemporary American system
of dealing with children in trouble." SIEGEL & SENNA, supra note 1, at 273; see
OJJDP REPORT, supra note 14, at 70 (describing the history and emergence of
the first juvenile courts in the United States). The moral principles that prompted
the Illinois reformers at the turn of the century to create a separate juvenile
justice system were:
(1) Children, because of their minority status, should not be held
as accountable as adult transgressors;
(2) The objective of juvenile justice is to help the youngster, to
treat and rehabilitate rather than punish;
(3) Disposition should be predicated on analysis of the youth's
special circumstances and needs; [and]
(4) The juvenile justice] system should avoid the punitive,
adversary and formalized trappings of the adult criminal
process ....
SIEGEL & SENNA, supra note 1, at 274.
The British doctrine of parens patriae (the State as parent) was the
rationale for the right of the State to intervene in the lives of children
in a manner different from the way it intervenes in the lives of adults.
The doctrine was interpreted as the inherent power and responsibility
of the State to provide protection for children whose natural parents
were not providing appropriate care and supervision because children
were not of full legal capacity.
OJJDP REPORT, supra note 14, at 70. The movement to help children in trouble
defined the differences between the juvenile justice system and the adult criminal
justice system. OJJDP REPORT, supra note 14, at 70.
The Illinois notion of creating a separate juvenile court system "spread
rapidly across the country" in the early twentieth century. SIEGEL & SENNA,
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course of the twentieth century, the direction a state intends to
follow with regard to its juveniles is first and foremost reflected
within the amendments that state has adopted to the statutory
purpose of its juvenile justice laws. 9 The original Illinois Juvenile
supra note 1, at 274. Until the recent onset of the get-tough era, "[s]tatutes
similar to the Illinois Juvenile Court Act [of 1899] were enacted in almost every
state." SIEGEL & SENNA, supra note 1, at 274; see Bleich, supra note 2, at 31
(finding a "striking similarity" among the states' juvenile justice statutes, which
for the most part, were modeled after the language of the original Illinois
statute). The Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 provided: "This act shall be
liberally construed, to the end that its purpose may be carried out, to-wit: [t]hat
the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly as may be
that which should be given by its parents. . . ." Juvenile Court Act § 21, 1899
I11. Laws 131, 137 (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/1-2
(1993 & Supp. 1996)).
'9 Bleich, supra note 3, at 32. The Illinois legislature has found that a
"substantial and disproportionate amount of serious crime is committed by a
relatively small number of juvenile offenders, otherwise known as serious
habitual offenders." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/1-8.1 (1993 & Supp.
1996). As of 1992, the Illinois legislature intended to support the efforts of the
juvenile justice system in the treatment of such habitual juvenile offenders. Id.
In order to enhance its rehabilitative efforts, Illinois established the Serious
Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program ("SHOCAP"). See id. ch. 705,
para. 405/1-8.2 (Supp. 1996). SHOCAP is a "multi-disciplinary interagency case
management and information sharing system that enables the juvenile justice
system, schools, and social service agencies to make more informed decisions
regarding a small number ofjuveniles who repeatedly commit serious delinquent
acts." Id. ch. 705, para. 405/1-8.2(a).
Recent developments, however, have marked the demise of Illinois as the
forerunner of the rehabilitative ideal. On October 13, 1994, two youths, ages 10
and 11, dangled and dropped five-year-old Eric Morse to his death from a 14th-
floor window of an abandoned Chicago apartment building because Eric refused
to steal candy. Gary Marx, 2 Guilty in Dropping Boy Out Window, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 19, 1995, at 1; Flynn McRoberts & Andrew Gottesman, State May Get
Tougher on Young, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 18, 1994, at 1. The two youths were found
guilty of killing Eric Morse and were placed in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections; thereby making them the nation's youngest juvenile
offenders ever to be sentenced to a high-security prison. Boy, 12, to Be Nation's
Youngest Prison Inmate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1996, at A 10. Ironically, Illinois,
the icon of the parens patriae doctrine, will be credited as the state with the
nation's youngest prison inmates.
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Court Act of 189920 focused on the same type of care that would
be given by the child's parents as its primary statutory goal. The
current purpose and policy of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act is to
secure for each child such care and guidance that will best serve
the "welfare of the minor and the best interests of the commu-
nity.",21 By including the best interests of the community as part
of its primary statutory purpose, Illinois subtly shifts the focus of
its juvenile justice system from the rehabilitation of children to the
protection of society and victims.
22
One of the most brazenly amended statutes, reflective of the
get-tough era,23 is that of Texas. Prior to 1995, the primary
20 Juvenile Court Act § 21, 1899 I11. Laws 131, 137 (current version at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/1-2); see supra note 18 (setting forth the statutory
language of the original Illinois Juvenile Court Act).
21 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/1-2(1) (emphasis added).
22 See generally McRoberts & Gottesman, supra note 19, at 1 (describing the
murder of young Eric Morse that hardened the attitude of Illinois legislators with
regard to juvenile offenders).
23 The "get-tough era" refers to the period beginning in the mid 1970s, and
extending to the present day, when "the public perceived that serious juvenile
crime was increasing and that the [juvenile justice] system was 'soft' on
offenders." OJJDP REPORT, supra note 14, at 72; Ron Harris, A Nation's
Children in Lockup; Political and Social Pressures Have Shifted the Focus of
Juvenile Justice from Rehabilitation to Punishment, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1993,
at Al (noting that America started to get-tough with juvenile criminals in the
mid- 1 970s). Many states responded to this misperception about juvenile crime
and the juvenile justice system by enacting a variety of "get-tough" legislation.
See OJJDP REPORT, supra note 14, at 72.
[Generally,] get-tough policy reforms include measures, such as 1)
increasing the use of juvenile incarceration, 2) mandating longer
determinant periods of confinement, 3) transferring more juveniles into
the adult criminal courts, 4) lowering the age at which particular
juvenile offenders come under criminal court jurisdiction . . . . The
general intent of all these get-tough reform measures is to handle
juvenile offenders in such a manner that sufficiently harsh punishment
is meted out, individual accountability established, and public safety
enhanced.... Get-tough proposals are invariably a response to the
perception that the heart of the juvenile crime problem is the inade-
quacy or bankruptcy of the juvenile justice system. The juvenile justice
system is frequently criticized for being too lenient, too forgiving, too
short-term, too rehabilitation and treatment-oriented, not sufficiently
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statutory purpose of the Juvenile Justice Code in Texas was "to
provide for the care, the protection, and the wholesome moral,
mental, and physical development of children coming within its
provisions. 2 4 However, the Texas legislature amended the
primary objectives of its Juvenile Justice Code in 1995 "to provide
for the protection of the public and public safety,",2' and "consis-
tent with the protection of the public and public safety ... to
promote the concept of punishment for criminal acts., 26 Although
the Texas statute did not entirely delete its original statutory
purpose providing for the care and protection of the child,27 the
legislature did accord this provision less weight by preempting it
with the aforementioned retributive provisions.
Similarly, Minnesota has forsaken the traditional belief that all
children are capable of being rehabilitated and that "no juveniles
should be imprisoned."28 In 1980, the "exclusively benevolent and
rehabilitative objectives" 29 of the purpose clause of Minnesota's
Juvenile Court Act3" were modified when the legislature supple-
mented them with the competing goals of "maintaining the integrity
of the substantive criminal law and developing individual responsi-
bility."'" The amendment to the purpose clause "signalled a
fundamental philosophical departure from the previous emphasis on
rehabilitation, and recognized that juvenile courts also punish and
exercise penal social control. 32 As a result, this shift toward a
punitive, and as a consequence of all these factors, ineffective.. . . [I]t
is frequently the case with juvenile offenders, much like adult[s], that
incarceration or imprisonment is proposed as the ultimate get-tough
answer.
David M. Altschuler, Tough and Smart Juvenile Incarceration: Reintegrating
Punishment, Deterrence and Rehabilitation, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 217,
217-18 (1994).
24 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5 1.01(1) (prior to 1995 amendment).
25 Id. § 51.01(1) (West 1996) (current version).
26 Id. § 51.01(2)(A) (emphasis added).
27 See id. § 51.01(3).
28 Curriden, supra note 4, at 69.
29 Feld, supra note 14, at 1017.
30 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.011-.301 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).
3' Feld, supra note 14, at 1017; see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.011(c).
32 Feld, supra note 14, at 1017.
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more punitive philosophy in dealing with delinquent children serves
to justify subsequent provisions that allow children to be tried as
adults and face the jail time connected with adult crime.33
Similar to Texas and Minnesota, the Idaho legislature has also
succumbed to the pressures of the "get-tough" era by amending and
redesignating its former Youth Rehabilitation Act 34 into its current
Juvenile Corrections Act.35 Prior to 1996, the purpose of the Idaho
juvenile justice system was to handle juvenile cases "through a
coordinated program of rehabilitation" that considered "the needs
and best interests of the child as well as the need for protection of
the community. ... 36 Today, however, the purpose of the
juvenile justice system has shifted away from its former commend-
able rehabilitative focus to one concerned primarily with the
following principles: "accountability; community protection; and
competency development., 37 Similar to the Minnesota framework,
statutory amendments that entirely delete or repress rehabilitative
goals serve as justification for subsequent retributive statutes, such
as automatic transfer provisions.38
33 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).
According to 1995 amendments, children involved in first-time or minor offenses
shall be subject to the traditional juvenile court jurisdiction. Id. However, persons
14-years-old or older who commit more serious felony offenses or who are
repeat offenders may be certified to the adult criminal court and. accorded the
same consequences as adult defendants. Id.
34 IDAHO CODE § 16-1801 (1979) (current version at IDAHO CODE § 20-501
(Supp. 1996)).
35 Id. §§ 20-501 to -547 (Supp. 1996).
36 Id. § 16-1801 (not effective after Oct. 1, 1995).
37 Id. § 20-501. The Idaho Juvenile Corrections Act states, in relevant part:
It is the policy of the state of Idaho that the juvenile corrections system
will be based on the following principles: accountability; community
protection; and competency development. Where a juvenile has been
found to be within the purview of the juvenile corrections act, the
court shall impose a sentence that will protect the community, hold the
juvenile accountable for his [or her] actions, and assist the juvenile in
developing skills to become a contributing member of a diverse
community....
Id.
3 See, e.g., id. §§ 20-506 to -509 (Supp. 1996). See also infra note 119
(setting forth a general explanation of transfer provisions).
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Supporters and legislators of amendments that make the juvenile
justice system increasingly retributive claim that such amendments
reflect public demand to "crack down" on serious juvenile
offenders. 39 To an extent, the public does support trying juveniles
who commit serious crimes in adult courts. However, the public
does not particularly favor sentencing juveniles to adult prisons or
giving juveniles the same sentences as adults.4" Although the
public wants to hold juveniles who commit serious crimes account-
able for their actions, they also want such juveniles to be treated
and rehabilitated.4' Contrary to the opinion of most legislators and
politicians,42 the public does not appear to be as punitive and
" Ira M. Schwartz, Juvenile Crime-Fighting Policies: What the Public
Really Wants, in JUVENILE JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 214 (Ira M. Schwartz
ed., 1992).
Citizens and politicians perceive a significant and frightening increase
in youth crime and violence. Concerns about the inability of juvenile
courts to rehabilitate chronic and violent young offenders, while
simultaneously protecting public safety, accompany the growing fear
of youth crime. A desire to "get-tough," fueled in part by frustration
with the intractability of crime, provides political impetus to transfer
some young offenders to criminal courts for prosecution as adults and
to strengthen the sanctioning powers of juvenile courts.
Feld, supra note 14, at 966.
40 Schwartz, supra note 39, at 216. According to a "national public opinion
survey of attitudes towards juvenile crime" conducted in 1991 by the University
of Michigan's Institute for Social Research: (1) 62% of the respondents did not
feel that juveniles should receive the same sentence as adults; (2) 63% did not
want juveniles sent to adult prisons for serious property offenses; (3) 68% did
not want juveniles imprisoned with adults for selling drugs; and (4) 55% did not
feel that juveniles should be sent to prison for serious violent crimes. Schwartz,
supra note 39, at 214-16.
41 Schwartz, supra note 39, at 216. "Depending upon the type of crime,
between 88-95[%] of the respondents want juveniles who commit serious
property, drug-related, and violent crimes treated and rehabilitated if at all
possible." Schwartz, supra note 39, at 216.
42 For example, U.S. Senator Carol Moseley-Braun of Illinois proposed an
amendment to the federal crime bill that would facilitate the transfer of juveniles
as young as 13-years-old who commit certain violent crimes to the adult criminal
court system. See generally Laura Murphy Lee, Should 13-Year-Olds Who
Commit Crimes with Firearms Be Tried as Adults?, 80 A.B.A. J. 47, 47 (1994)
(arguing that Sen. Moseley-Braun's proposed amendment would be ineffective
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demanding of retribution toward juvenile offenders as lobbyists of
retribution would like to believe.43
B. Welfare of the Child Versus Best Interests of the State
State statutory preambles that contain phrases similar to
"welfare of the minor" and "best interest of the state" imply that
the well-being of the child must be balanced against the safety of
the public in determining the disposition of the juvenile in
question.44 Not surprisingly, many states utilize such middle-of-
the-road and arbitrary statutory language as a catch-all justification
for choices made within their juvenile justice system.45
in deterring juvenile crime); Avis LaVelle, Should Children Be TriedAs Adults?,
ESSENCE, Sept. 1994, at 85 (setting forth the opposing attitudes toward juvenile
crime-punitive versus rehabilitative-adopted by various specified politicians,
juvenile justice advocates, scholars and a retired judge). Furthermore, it is argued
that "[h]ardened public attitudes" have prompted politicians to adopt harsher
stances toward juvenile crime as a re-election tool. Penelope Lemov, The Assault
on Juvenile Justice, GOVERNING MAG., Dec. 1994, at 26. To the extent, however,
that the adjudication of juvenile offenders as adults may translate into "good
politics," it does not necessarily translate into "good social policy." Id.
(questioning whether treating juvenile offenders like adult offenders is "good
social policy").
"3 "The public does not support the current movement to abandon the
historical mission and purpose of the juvenile court. By an overwhelming
majority, the [public] wants the juvenile court to retain its emphasis on treatment
and rehabilitation, an emphasis contrary to current public policy in a growing
number of states." Schwartz, supra note 39, at 222-23; see Schwartz et al., supra
note 12, at 257 (finding that there exists widespread public support for the
rehabilitation of juveniles within the juvenile court system). For statistics
supporting the proposition that the majority of the public favors therehabilitation
of juvenile offenders, see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
44 See generally Bleich, supra note 2, at 34-35 (providing examples of states
that have modified the language of the preamble to their juvenile laws).
4' For example, the purpose ofjuvenile proceedings in the New York Family
Court is to "consider the needs and best interests of the [juvenile] as well as the
need for protection of the community." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.1 (Consol.
1987); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-1.1; ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-302 (Michie
1993 & Supp. 1995); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West 1984 & Supp.
1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-102 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); GA.
CODE ANN. § 15-11-1 (1994); RAW. REV. STAT. § 571-1 (1993); ILL. REV.
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The Arkansas Juvenile Code's primary purpose is "to assure
that all juveniles brought to the attention of the courts receive the
guidance, care, and control.., which will best serve the emotional,
mental, and physical welfare of the juvenile and the best interests
of the state."4 6 However, subsequent language within the statute,
stressing the protection of society and recognizing that sanctions
commensurate "with the seriousness of the offense [are] appropriate
in all cases," provides evidence that the Arkansas legislature is not
adverse to the use of retributive measures with respect to its
youngest offenders.47
Similarly, the Maine Juvenile Code primarily seeks to procure
for each juvenile "such care and guidance" that will "best serve"
both the welfare of the child and the interests of society.48 How-
ever, as part of its statutory purpose, the Maine Juvenile Code also
seeks to remove juveniles from their family environment "where
necessary to punish" such juveniles. 49 Like the Arkansas statute,
subsequent language infers that the Maine legislature has not
foregone the notion of punishment of its juvenile offenders.
STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/1-2 (1993 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-1-
1.1; IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.1 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-1601 (1993 & Supp. 1995); LA. CODE JuV. PROC. ANN. art. 801 (West
1995) (children's code); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3002 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-802 (1995 & Supp.
1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.1 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 43-21-103 (1993 & Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.011
(Vernon 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-102 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
246 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62.031 (Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 169-B:1 (1994 & Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-21 (West 1987
& Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-01 (1991 & Supp. 1995); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.01 (Anderson 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 419A.002 (1995); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6301; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-2 (1994); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§26-7A-6 (1992 & Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5501 (1991 & Supp.
1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-227 (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE § 49-1-1 (1995
& Supp. 1996).
46 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-302(1) (emphasis added).
41 Id. § 9-27-302(3).
48 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3002(1)(A).
49 Id. § 3002(1)(C) (emphasis added).
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In addition to the Arkansas and Maine statutes, the primary
statutory purpose of the Maryland juvenile justice system is "to
provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and
physical development of children ... and to provide for a program
of treatment, training, and rehabilitation consistent with the child
best interests and the protection of the public interest."5 How-
ever, unlike the Arkansas and Maine statutes, the ensuing provi-
sions of the Maryland purpose statute do not stress the protection
of the public and punishment of the child over the best interests of
the child. Rather, the Maryland purpose clause strikes a feasible
balance among its competing statutory goals.5 The purpose clause
of the Maryland Juvenile Code thereby serves as an example that
it is viable for state legislatures to enumerate complementary
policies for their juvenile justice system that incorporate both the
notions of rehabilitation and discipline.
1. Protection of the Public and Punishment of the Child
Certain states have responded to contemporary societal reform
by bolstering their commitment to community protection and
punishment of juvenile offenders.52 Such states have consciously
50 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-802(a)(1) (emphasis added).
"I The subsequent provisions of the Maryland purpose statute, that promote
both the best interests of the child and the best interests of the public, provide
in pertinent part:
(2) To remove from children committing delinquent acts the
taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal
behavior;
(3) To conserve and strengthen the child's family ties and to
separate a child from his parents only when necessary for his
welfare or the interest of public safety ...
(5) If necessary to remove a child from his home, to secure for
him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible
equivalent to that which should have been given by his
parents ....
Id. § 3-802(a)(1)-(5); see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-102(1)(a)-(d) (striking
a functional balance between its primary statutory goals of best serving the
welfare of the child and the interests of society).
2 Bleich, supra note 2, at 35. For example, the primary purpose of the Utah
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chosen to "downplay the role of rehabilitation" within the pre-
ambles of their juvenile justice statutes in order to spotlight their
recently embraced retributive stance.53 For instance, the intent of
the Washington state legislature is to create a juvenile justice
system where juvenile offenders are held accountable for their
criminal behavior.54 To effectuate this policy, the preamble to the
Juvenile Justice Act in Washington explicitly provides for the
punishment of juvenile offenders." Similarly, the preamble to the
Texas Juvenile Justice Code first and foremost provides for the
juvenile courts is to "promote public safety and individual accountability by the
imposition of appropriate sanctions on persons who have committed acts in
violation of the law." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-102(5)(a) (Supp. 1996); see,
e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-1; IDAHO CODE § 20-501; NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
246; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-516 (1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7301-1.2
(West 1987 & Supp. 1996); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.01; WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 13.40.010 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996).
Punishment or retribution refers to "the application of some pain or loss to
a wrongdoer by someone in a position of authority." Richard Barnum, The
Development of Responsibility: Implications for Juvenile Justice, in FROM
CHILDREN TO CITIZENS, supra note 1, at 67, 74. Discipline administered by the
parents of young children is the "most widely accepted use [of punishment]" in
America. Id. When administered in the juvenile or criminal justice system,
however, the effects of punishment upon a child is uncertain. Id. at 74-75. If
exercised cautiously, punishment can be a useful means of fostering a sense of
responsibility in children. Id. at 75. Punishment of juvenile offenders, if and
when applied, should not be so oppressive as to displace otherwise normal child
development. Id. Rather, punishment of juvenile offenders should take the form
of "fines, restrictions, restitution, and victim confrontation," as opposed to
unprolific incarceration. Id. Regardless of how effective punishment might be in
deterring criminal behavior, the juvenile offender would still lack the qualities
that "motivate non-offensive choices," and the social skills to effectively carry
out such choices, without the proper treatment. Id. See generally Greenwood,
supra note 15, at 92 (finding that social competence is an aspect of child
development that can improve with treatment).
" Feld, supra note 8, at 842.
14 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2).
" The statutory purpose of the Washington Juvenile Justice Act provides
"for punishment commensurate with the age, crime, and criminal history of the
juvenile offender." Id. § 13.40.010(2)(d) (emphasis added).
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protection of the public and promotes the concept of punishment
for criminal acts.56
The primary statutory goal of the Oklahoma Juvenile Code is
to promote public safety.57 However, unlike the Washington and
Texas statutes, subsequent statutory language of the Oklahoma
purpose statute espouses not only the best interests of the public,58
but also the best interests and the rehabilitation of the juvenile
offender. 9 The Oklahoma legislature does not seek to achieve its
primary goal of public safety at the expense of the child. Rather,
the legislature intends to reform juvenile offenders into productive
members of society through a system of rehabilitation that
reintegrates juvenile offenders into society as responsible individ-
uals. 60 The framework of the Oklahoma statute, which initially
appears to forego the future of the individual child for the safety of
society, actually serves as an example of a statutory framework that
appeases both society, by providing for the protection of the public;
and the advocates of child welfare, by providing for a system of
rehabilitation that fosters individual responsibility.6' However,
despite the secondary placement of rehabilitation within its statutory
purpose clause, there exists a commendable overall tenet within the
56 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.01; see supra notes 25-27 and accompanying
text (setting forth the language of the preamble to the Texas Juvenile Justice
Code).
17 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7301-1.2.
" Id. § 7301-1.2(3). The Oklahoma Juvenile Court supports its primary goal
of protecting the best interests of the public through means that "maintain the
integrity of substantive law prohibiting certain behavior and developing
individual responsibility for lawful behavior." Id.
'9 Id. § 7301-1.2(4). The Oklahoma Juvenile Code ranks its goal for the
"rehabilitation and reintegration of juvenile delinquents into society" secondary
to its goal of public safety. Id.
60 Id. § 7301-1.2(4), (7).
6 Similar to the Oklahoma statute, the recently amended Idaho Juvenile
Corrections Act includes subsequent statutory language which implicates that the
state has not completely foregone the welfare of the child through its punitive
amendments. See IDAHO CODE § 20-501 (mandating that the court adjudicate
juvenile offenders in a manner that will not only protect society, but will also
"assist the juvenile in developing skills to become a contributing member of a
diverse community").
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Oklahoma statute evinced by its intention to strive toward reform-
ing wayward children into productive members of society.
2. Protection and Rehabilitation of the Child
The states that have chosen not to allow public demands for
harsher treatment of juvenile offenders to affect their statutory
framework provide an optimistic example of the rehabilitative
ideal.6 2 Such states have chosen to reduce their "coercive commu-
nity protection powers" by crafting standards with a primary
emphasis on the "best interests of the child,"63 the "protection of
the child," the "welfare of the child" and the "rehabilitation of
delinquent children."64 For example, the intent of the New
62 For example, Massachusetts states as the primary purpose of its juvenile
justice system: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the commonwealth to
direct its efforts,first, to the strengthening and encouragement of family life for
the protection and care of children. . . ." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 1
(West 1994 & Supp. 1996) (emphasis added); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. chs. 39.001-
.002 (1988 & Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-1; KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 600.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.011; MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-5-102; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:1; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:4A-21; N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-01; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.01;
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6301; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-20; S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 26-7A-5 (1992 & Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-101
(1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5501; W. VA. CODE § 49-1-1; WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 48.01 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
63 The "best interests of the child" standard developed via the doctrine of
parenspatriae, and although beyond precise definition, basically holds the child's
best interest "paramount" over other considerations, such as the protection of the
public. Suzanne D. Strater, The Juvenile Death Penalty: In the Best Interests of
the Child?, 22 HUM. RTs. 10, 12 (1995). The Supreme Court stated, "our cases
show that although children generally are protected by the same constitutional
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the state is entitled
to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs
for 'concern, . . . sympathy, and ... paternal attention."' Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 635 (1979). Furthermore, the Supreme Court's landmark decision, In
re Gault, described the juvenile justice system as a process "where the child was
to be treated and rehabilitated and the procedures from apprehension through
institutionalization were to be clinical rather than punitive." 387 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1967).
64 Bleich, supra note 2, at 37.
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Hampshire legislature is "[t]o encourage the wholesome moral,
mental, emotional, and physical development of each minor... by
providing the protection, care, treatment, counseling, supervision,
and rehabilitative resources which such minor needs."65
65 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:1(I). In addition, the aim of the West
Virginia child welfare system is to rehabilitate and protect, rather than punish,
children. See W. VA. CODE § 49-1-1. According to the West Virginia Child
Welfare Code:
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive system of
child welfare throughout the State which will assure to each child such
care and guidance ... and will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental
and physical welfare of the child; preserve and strengthen the child's
family ties whenever possible with recognition of the fundamental
rights of parenthood and with recognition of the State's responsibility
to assist the family in providing necessary education and training to
reduce the rate of juvenile delinquency and to provide a system for the
rehabilitation or detention of juvenile delinquents and the protection of
the welfare of the general public. In pursuit of these goals it is the
intention of the legislature to provide for removing the child from the
custody of the parents only when the child's welfare or the safety and
protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without
removal; and, when the child has to be removed from his or her
family, to secure for the child custody, care and discipline consistent
with the child's best interests ....
Id.
West Virginia established the Juvenile Offender Rehabilitation Act as a
means of supporting and effectuating its rehabilitative goal. The Juvenile
Offender Rehabilitation Act provides for the creation of "all reasonable means
and methods that can be established by a humane and enlightened state, solicitous
of the welfare of its children, for the prevention of delinquency and for the care
and rehabilitation of delinquent children." Id. § 49-5B-2 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
Furthermore, the Juvenile Offender Rehabilitation Act promises to "continuously
refine and develop a balanced and comprehensive state program for children who
are potentially delinquent or are delinquent ...." Id.
Despite the commendable rehabilitative statutory rhetoric posed by the West
Virginia legislature, 1995 amendments to the West Virginia Child Welfare Code
lowered the age of accountability for crime from 16- to 14-years of age, thus
requiring the adult criminal justice system to deal with more juveniles. See id
§ 49-5-10 (1995); Virginia Jackson Hopkins, In Juvenile Crimes the More Things
Change the More They Stay the Same, W. VA. LAW., Nov. 1995, at 16. Although
not required, the juvenile court may even transfer a child younger than 14-years-
old to the adult criminal justice system if there is probable cause to believe that
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According to the Florida legislature, the main purpose of its
juvenile justice agenda is to provide general protection for children
including "effective treatment to address [the] physical, social, and
emotional needs" of children.66 However, subsequent language of
the Florida statute suggests that the above quoted mandate does not
apply equally to juvenile offenders. The Florida statute gives
preference to the protection of the public over the rehabilitation of
the child.67 Although the Florida statute retains a rehabilitative
ideal within its preamble, the legislature assigns rehabilitation of
juvenile offenders the lowest rank among its list of objectives for
delinquency protection.6"
the child has committed an offense of violence which would be a felony if the
child were an adult. See W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10(e)-(f) (1995 & Supp. 1996).
However, the success of a state's rehabilitative policy depends upon the
rehabilitative programs it adopts and the impact such programs have on the
criminal behavior of youths. Greenwood, supra note 15, at 92. Society has a
tendency to prematurely conclude that rehabilitation programs do not work if,
after treatment, the juvenile continues to commit crimes. Greenwood, supra note
15, at 92. However, concern for the future of society warrants efforts for
pursuing more effective rehabilitative techniques because youths that are most at
risk of becoming chronic offenders should not be "consigned to careers of
repeated incarceration" merely because their families and communities have
failed them. Greenwood, supra note 15, at 93. The juvenile justice system owes
to wayward children the promise that it will make as great an effort as possible
to reform them. See generally Greenwood, supra note 15, at 93 (promulgating
an idealistic approach to the juvenile justice system).
66 FLA. STAT. ch. 39.002(l)(e).
67 The Florida statute states in relevant part that "[iut is the policy of the
state with respect to juvenile justice and delinquency prevention to first protect
the public from acts of delinquency .... " Id. ch. 39.002(3) (emphasis added).
68 See id. ch. 39.002(3)(d). In addition to "first protect[ing] the public from
acts of delinquency," it is also the policy of Florida to:
(a) Develop and implement effective methods of preventing and
reducing acts of delinquency, with a focus on maintaining
and strengthening the family as a whole so that children may
remain in their homes or communities.
(b) Develop and implement effective programs to prevent
delinquency, to divert children from the traditional juvenile
justice system, to intervene at an early stage of delinquency,
and to provide critically needed alternatives to institutional-
ization and deep-end commitment.
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Similarly, the Minnesota legislature explicitly states in its
Juvenile Court Act that "the paramount consideration in all
proceedings concerning a child alleged or found to be in need of
protective services is the best interests of the child."69 Like the
Florida statute, however, subsequent language gives preference to
the protection of the public over the rehabilitation of the child.7"
The Florida and Minnesota statutes, unlike the New Hampshire
juvenile justice statutory preamble, exemplify the contradictions
inherent within such statutes that prima facie promote the compet-
ing interests of punishment and rehabilitation.7"
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, there has been a
movement away from placing the primary focus of the juvenile
justice system on treatment. Several jurisdictions have included
public safety, accountability and punishment as the primary
(c) Provide well-trained personnel, high-quality services, and
cost-effective programs within the juvenile justice system.
(d) Increase the capacity of local governments and public and
private agenciesto conduct rehabilitative treatment programs
and to provide research, evaluation, and training services in
the field of juvenile delinquency prevention.
Id. ch. 39.002(3)(a)-(d) (emphasis added).
69 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.011(a).
70 The Minnesota statute states that "[t]he purpose of the laws relating to
children alleged or adjudicated to be delinquent is to promote the public safety
and reduce juvenile delinquency by maintaining the integrity of the substantive
law prohibiting certain behavior and by developing individual responsibility for
lawful behavior." Id. § 260.011 (c). The legislature, however, ameliorated its
harsher statutory stance towards juvenile delinquents by further stating that the
purpose of promoting public safety and respect for the law over rehabilitation
"should be pursued through means that are fair and just, that recognize the
unique characteristics and needs of children, and that give children access to
opportunities for personal and social growth." Id.
71 For a further example of the contradictions inherent in the Florida's
juvenile justice system, contrast FLA. STAT. ch. 39.052(3) (1988 & Supp. 1996)
(providing for the transfer of a child for prosecution as an adult) with id ch.
39.002(5) (recognizing that Florida prisons are inadequate to meet the rehabili-
tative needs of children who have been adjudicated in adult criminal court). See
HAw. REv. STAT. § 571-1 (stating that the policy and purpose of the family
court system in Hawaii is to both "foster the rehabilitation of juveniles in
difficulty" and to "render appropriate punishment to offenders").
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
purposes of their juvenile laws.72 These examples illustrate that
certain jurisdictions have taken steps to reconstruct their laws in
light of modem developments. Despite recent retributive rhetoric,
it is conceivable for a state to retain the traditional rehabilitative
paragon as the overriding statutory juvenile justice policy within
that state.73
C. Novel Statutory Goals
Statutory preambles that set forth unconventional goals for a
state's juvenile justice agenda may serve as alternative models to
the traditional rehabilitative means of dealing with the realities of
youth crime in America. The Delinquency Act of New Mexico's
Children's Code exemplifies such a novel approach.74 The primary
purpose of the New Mexico Delinquency Act is
72 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (setting forth those states that
stress the protection of the public and the punishment of the child as the primary
goal of their juvenile justice systems).
7' For example, Massachusettshas not substantively changed its rehabilitative
purpose clause since 1906. The first purpose clause Massachusetts enacted
provided:
This act shall be liberally construed to the end that the care, custody
and discipline of the children brought before the court shall approxi-
mate as nearly as possible that which they should receive from their
parents, and that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated, not as
criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance.
Proceedings against children under this act shall not be deemed to be
criminal proceedings.
1906 Mass. Acts 413, § 2. The current statute is substantially similar to the
statute enacted in 1906, and it provides in pertinent part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this commonwealth to direct
its efforts, first, to the strengthening and encouragement of family life
for the protection and care of children; to assist and encourage the use
by any family of all available resources to this end; and to provide
substitute care of children only when the family itself or the resources
available to the family are unable to provide the necessary care and
protection to insure the rights of any child to sound health and normal
physical, mental, spiritual and moral development.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 1.
74 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-2 (Michie 1995).
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to remove from children committing delinquent acts the
adult consequences of criminal behavior, but to still hold
children committing delinquent acts accountable for their
actions to the extent of the child's age, education, mental
and physical condition, background and all other relevant
factors, and to provide a program of supervision, care and
rehabilitation including rehabilitative restitution by the
child to the victims of the child's delinquent act to the
extent that the child is reasonably able to do so ......
Not only does the New Mexico statute make it a definitive goal to
avoid transferring a juvenile offender to the jurisdiction of the adult
criminal justice system, it also provides a statutory exigency to
regard a youth as a child in determining how to hold the child
"accountable" for his or her actions.76 Consistent with its statutory
purpose to rehabilitate delinquent children while instilling discipline
commensurate with the circumstances unique to each child, the
New Mexico legislature has found that "the availability of treatment
alternatives is likely to decrease repeated criminal activity.""
71 Id. § 32A-2-2(A). The statute goes further to provide an emphasis on
"community-based alternatives" as a deterrent to acts ofjuvenile delinquency. Id.
§ 32A-2-2(B).
76 Id. § 32A-2-2(A).
77 Id. § 32A-13-1 (Michie 1995). The "treatment alternatives" which the
legislature was referring to are the "forensic evaluation program" and the
"wilderness experience program." See id. §§ 32A-13-1 to -3 (Michie 1995). The
forensic evaluation program provides evaluations of juvenile offenders in order
to recommend referral of the individual child to the appropriate state agency or
program for the proper treatment. Id § 32A-13-2. One of the programs that a
child might be referred to, based on the results of such child's forensic
evaluation, is the wilderness experience program. Id. § 32A- 13-3. The wilderness
experience program provides an alternative to traditional rehabilitation for
juveniles referred from criminal justice agencies who are diagnosed as in need
of such intensive treatment. Id.
A boot camp [or wilderness program] is a constructive approach to
offender rehabilitation. A boot camp program is modeled after military
basic training. The program is designed for young... offenders who
have been convicted of a felony and who would probably be sent to
prison for the first time but for the boot camp option. The program
lasts from three to six months, depending on the state. Brief confine-
ment in a boot camp is intended to "shock" participants into realizing
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In addition to the New Mexico approach, California has also
adopted an atypical statutory premise in its Juvenile Court Law. 78
The California code expressly mandates that the guidance and
treatment provided to children "may include punishment that is
consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter. 79
However, the California legislature explicitly excludes from the
term "punishment" notions of retribution.8 ° Furthermore, it assigns
to the term "punishment" a narrow and enumerated definition.8"
A 1984 amendment of the purpose of the Juvenile Court Law that
placed an emphasis on "punishment" did not alter the overall
rehabilitative aspect of the California juvenile justice system. 2
the harsh reality of prison life without subjecting them to long prison
sentences and direct contact with hardened criminals. (The boot camp
population is not mixed with regular prison inmates). The program
gives the young offender who has never been in prison one last chance
to change his [or her] criminal way of life. It is designed to put the
offender in a state of mind and body where he [or she] can make a
commitment to change and personal growth. The objectives are to
instill in the offender self-discipline, self-responsibility, self-respect,
self-esteem, self-motivation, and a solid work ethic.
Carol Ann Nix, Boot Camp/Shock Incarceration-An Alternative to Prison for
Young, Non-Violent Offenders in the United States, PROSECUTOR, Mar./Apr.
1994, at 16.
71 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202.
79 Id. § 202(b) (emphasis added).
80 See id § 202(e) (stating that "'[p]unishment,' for the purpose of this
chapter, does not include retribution").
S "Punishment"-as used in the purpose clause of the California Juvenile
Court Law-includes the following:
(1) Payment of a fine by the minor.
(2) Rendering of compulsory service without compensation
performed for the benefit of the community by the minor.
(3) Limitations on the minor's liberty imposed as a condition of
probation or parole.
(4) Commitment of the minor to a local detention or treatment
facility ....
(5) Commitment of the minor to the Department of the Youth
Authority.
Id. § 202(e)(1)-(5).
12 See In re Ronnie P., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 881 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting
that "'[e]ach time a ward comes before the court.., the goal of any resulting
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Similar to New Mexico, California seeks to separate juvenile
offenders as much as possible from the retributive reality of adult
adjudication in honor of the rehabilitative mandates of the original
juvenile court system. At the same time, California acknowledges
the modem trend that juveniles, although in need of rehabilitation,
are not free from qualified forms of retribution.83
II. DRAWING PURPOSES FROM CASE LAW
Whether the statutory rhetoric of a state vies to protect the
interests of the community, the interests of the child, or both, is not
wholly determinative of the juvenile justice policy practiced within
that state.84 It is necessary to look beyond the explicit statutory
objectives of a particular state's juvenile justice laws and examine
how the courts of that state interpret such laws. In addition, the
historical and legislative objectives behind the juvenile justice
system of states that do not embody express statutory preambles
dispositional order is to rehabilitate the minor' (quoting In re Scott K., 203 Cal.
Rptr. 268, 272 (Ct. App. 1984)); In re Charles C., 284 Cal. Rptr. 4, 8-9 (Ct.
App. 1991) (reasoning that the underlying purpose of the juvenile justice system
remains rehabilitative, despite the use of the term "punishment" in the statute, to
support the confinement at the California Youth Authority rehabilitative program
for juvenile offenses).
" California's "punishment" of minors is a rehabilitativetool distinguishable
from the criminal justice system for adults which has a purely punitive purpose.
Charles C., 284 Cal. Rptr. at 9. Thus, even though punishment is now an express
purpose of the Juvenile Court Law in California, the underlying purpose of the
juvenile system remains sufficiently distinct from the adult criminal system to
support confinement in juvenile facilities coupled with rehabilitative programs.
Id.
84 "Juvenile justice policy is usually made in an emotionally charged
atmosphere. Debates are often devoid of data and hard facts needed for making
sound decisions. Decisions are usually made by elected public officials and
juvenile justice professionals who are out of touch with public opinion."
Schwartz, supra note 39, at 224. Contrary to the opinion of most elected
officials, the public is neither as punitive nor as exacting of retribution toward
juvenile offenders as promoters of retribution like to assume. See supra notes 40-
41 and accompanying text (setting forth the results of a public opinion survey of
attitudes towards juvenile crime).
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defining their juvenile justice goals can also be drawn from case
law.8
5
By way of illustration, the Arizona Juvenile Court laws set forth
the process by which a juvenile offender is adjudicated without
enumerating the purpose of its juvenile court system into express
statutory form.86 Recent judicial opinions reveal that the under-
lying theme within the Arizona juvenile court system is the
rehabilitation of the child, which is expected to satisfy both the best
interests of the child and of society.8 7 The Court of Appeals of
Arizona actively supports having its juvenile offenders-even its
violent juvenile offenders-remain within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court, as opposed to facilitating transfer to the jurisdiction
of the adult criminal courts.88 The court advocates this view
85 See supra note 10 (setting forth those states that do not provide preambles
to their juvenile justice laws).
86 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-201 to -251.
87 See, e.g., In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-500210, 864
P.2d 560, 562 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "the purpose of sentencing
schemes for juveniles is rehabilitation, whereas the purpose for adults is
punishment"); State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 823 P.2d 1347, 1351-52
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (deferring to juvenile court's finding that it is in the
public's best interest that defendant be rehabilitated in the juvenile justice
system).
88 Where the juvenile court ordered intensive rehabilitative treatment for a
juvenile adjudicated delinquent for assault despite the juvenile's voluntary request
for punitive incarceration over rehabilitation, the Court of Appeals of Arizona
affirmed the rehabilitative order of the lower court on the grounds that "[j]uve-
niles are less likely than adults to have the knowledge, experience and maturity
to determine what is in their own best interest." Juvenile Action No. JV-500210,
864 P.2d at 561-62. Therefore, unlike adults, juveniles do not have the right to
reject rehabilitative orders from the juvenile court that are deemed to be in the
best interest of the child. Id. The purpose of adjudication as a juvenile is
rehabilitation, whereas the purpose for adults is punishment. Id. Given these
considerations, the court's choice of treatment for the juvenile should be given
the opportunity to reach fruition. Id.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that the juvenile court is not
bound to transfer a juvenile for adjudication as an adult even though the state
and juvenile have stipulated, as part of a plea agreement, that such transfer
should occur. Romley, 823 P.2d at 1350. In deciding to retain juvenile court
jurisdiction over the juvenile, the court stated that "[i]t is in the public's safety
and interest that this person be rehabilitated so that this type of offense is not
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because the probability that the juvenile will become a productive
member of society is greater where the juvenile is placed in an
environment conducive to rehabilitation.89
Similarly, Alaska does not statutorily enunciate the goals of its
juvenile justice system. However, a judicial opinion of its supreme
court reveals that "rehabilitation [of the child] rather than punish-
ment is the express purpose of juvenile jurisdiction."90 The rubric
behind the juvenile court is that individuals under the age of
eighteen9" do not possess "mature judgment and may not fully
realize the consequences of [their] acts, and that therefore [such
individuals] should not generally have to bear the stigma of a
criminal conviction for the rest of [their lives]."92 Sample case law
consequently reveals that both Arizona and Alaska tend to embrace
the traditional rehabilitative approach towards juvenile justice.
likely to occur again." Id. at 1351.
'9 As further support of its decision to retain juvenile court jurisdiction over
a juvenile offender, the Arizona Court of Appeals stated:
This Court believes from the evidence presented that this rehabilitation
is more likely to take place in the juvenile system than in the adult
system. If the Court were to transfer the juvenile to the adult court and
he were convicted of Second Degree Murder, the juvenile would have
to serve between 10 to 20 years in prison. This Court does not believe
that lengthy incarceration without psychological treatment will do
anything for this young man or for society, other than turn him into
someone who truly has the potential of intentionally causing harm to
others.
Id.; see supra note 14 and accompanying text (finding that a rehabilitative
atmosphere is more conducive to the reformation of wayward children than is a
punitive atmosphere).
90 See, e.g., Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134, 140 n.21 (Alaska 1978). In keeping
with its rehabilitative stance, the Rust court maintained that "[m]ere confinement
without treatment does not contribute to the goal of rehabilitation . . . ." Id.
Furthermore, the court concluded that a "limited right to treatment stems from
... notions of rehabilitation and the desire to render inmates useful and
productive citizens upon their release." Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
9' SeeALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a) (1995) (stating thatproceedingsrelating
to a minor under the age of 18 are governed by the juvenile court jurisdiction).
92 In re P.H., 504 P.2d 837, 841 (Alaska 1972). In holding that a child under
the age of 18 is "exempt" from prosecution as an adult until the juvenile court
determines otherwise, the Supreme Court of Alaska implicated the "principal
precept" of its juvenile court system as protector of recalcitrant children. Id.
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Judicial decisions pertaining to juvenile offenders also edify the
true juvenile justice policy behind those states that enumerate
sweeping yet competing interests within their statutory pre-
ambles.93 For example, in dicta, the Supreme Court of Alabama
agreed with the .general notion that the state's Juvenile Justice Act
aims to rehabilitate,94 but the court justified its punitive holding
by assigning substantial weight to the part of the Juvenile Justice
Act which mandates the "protection and discipline of children."95
9' The statutory purpose of the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act is "to facilitate
the care, protection and discipline of the children who come within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, while acknowledging the responsibility of the
juvenile court to preserve the public peace and security." ALA. CODE § 12-15-
1.1. In furtherance of this purpose, the Alabama- legislature established the
following comprehensive, yet paradoxical, list of goals for its juvenile court:
(1) To preserve and strengthen the child's family whenever possible
* . .(2) To remove the child from the custody of his or her parents
only when it is judicially determined to be in his or her best interest
or for the safety and protection of the public ... (4) To secure for any
child removed from parental custody the necessary treatment, care,
guidance and discipline to assist him or her in becoming a responsible
productive member of society; (5) To promote a continuum of services
for children and their families from prevention to aftercare, considering
wherever possible, prevention, diversion, and early intervention; (6) To
promote the use of community based alternatives as deterrents to acts
of juvenile delinquency and as least restrictive dispositional alterna-
tives; (7) To hold a child found to be delinquent accountable for his or
her actions to the extent of the child's age, education, mental and
physical condition, background and all other relevant factors and to
provide a program of supervision, care and rehabilitation, including
rehabilitative restitution by the child to the victim of his [or her]
delinquent acts to the extent that the child is reasonably able to do so;
(8) To achieve the foregoing goals in the least restrictive setting
necessary, with a preference at all times for the preservation of the
family ....
Id. § 12-15-1.1(1)-(8); see IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-1-1.1 (including as part of
the statutory goal of its juvenile law the importance of the family, rehabilitation,
public safety, diversionary programs, accountability for one's actions, appropriate
sanctions and fair judicial proceedings).
94 Ex Parte R.E.C., No. 1930922, 1995 WL 560029, at *3 (Ala. Sept. 22,
1995).
91 d. (quoting ALA. CODE § 12-15-1.1). The court in R.E.C. provided
further support for its choice to interpret the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act as
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The court concluded that "the legislature did not intend to restrict
the juvenile court exclusively to courses of action devoid of an
arguably punitive flavor."96 Thus, as exemplified, the comprehen-
sive and conflicting statutory purpose of the Alabama Juvenile
Justice Act is of limited utility, if any, in shaping the direction of
the juvenile justice system in Alabama because it neither empha-
sizes preferred goals nor excludes undesirable goals.
Similar to the competing statutory goals within the Alabama
Juvenile Justice Act, the purpose clause of the New York Family
Court Act 97 also contains competing statutory goals. However,
unlike the comprehensive Alabama statute, the New York statute
simply contains two distinct yet vital purposes. The purpose clause
of the New York Family Court Act states that "[i]n any proceeding
under this article, the court shall consider the needs and best
interests of the [juvenile] as well as the need for protection of the
community."9" The section of the purpose clause concerning the
punitive in this instance by referring to the definition of the term "discipline"
provided in Webster's New International Dictionary. Id. "'Discipline'(asa noun)
signifies 'punishment; ... retribution for an offense, especially in a subordinate;
.. .control gained by enforcing obedience or order.' As a verb, it means 'to
chastise, to impose a penalty upon."' Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1994)).
96 Id.
97 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 301-385 (Consol. 1987).
98 Id. § 301.1. Similarly, according to the Michigan Probate Court and
Juvenile Court, the state shall ensure that each minor coming within the
jurisdiction of the court "shall receive the care, guidance, and control ... as will
be conducive to the child's welfare and the best interest of the state." MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.1(2); see MICH. CT. R. 5.902(B)(1) (1991) (setting
forth a dual statutory purpose for the probate court). Consistent with its statutory
purpose, the Supreme Court of Michigan has interpreted the purpose behind its
juvenile court rules as favoring "individualized tailoring of a juvenile's sentence
with emphasis on both the child's and society's welfare." People v. Hana, 504
N.W.2d 166, 178 (Mich. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1120 (1994). The court
in Hana derived support for the statutory purpose behind the state's juvenile
court from one of the factors in its waiver statute which requires that the court
consider "whether the best interest of the public welfare and the protection of the
public security require that the juvenile stand trial as an adult offender." MICH.
CT. R. 5.950(B)(2)(c)(vi) (1991); see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.4(4)
(West 1993 & Supp. 1996) (setting forth waiver criteria, all of which must be
considered in deciding whether to grant waiver, "giving greater weight to the
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needs and best interests of the child represents a codification of the
historical purpose of the juvenile justice system in New York. 99
However, the section of the purpose clause pertaining to the
protection of the community directly conflicts with the statute's
benevolent historical purpose.00 Despite the competing statutory
purposes of the New York juvenile justice system, the courts have
generally adhered to the notion that the best interest of the child is
the significant, if not primary, purpose of the family court.
Nonetheless, it is not the only consideration because the family
court must also consider the protection of the community.'
South Dakota also codifies conflicting statutory purposes for its
juvenile justice system. However, unlike New York, where the
conflicting statutory purposes are located within the same statute,
the South Dakota legislature has drafted two separate and entirely
contradictory purpose statutes. In one statute, it is briefly and
concisely mandated that all juvenile proceedings "shall be in the
best interests of the child."'0 2 However, according to the statute
immediately following, the same juvenile proceedings "shall be
liberally construed in favor of the child, the child's parents and the
state for the purposes of ... affording guidance, control and
rehabilitation of any child in need of supervision or any delinquent
child." 10 3
seriousness of the alleged offense and the juvenile's prior record of delinquency
than to the other criteria").
" See generally Merril Sobie, Practice Commentary, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 301.1 (setting forth a history of the purpose of the New York juvenile justice
system).
100 Id
10' See, e.g., In re Kevin G., 159 Misc. 2d 288, 295, 604 N.Y.S.2d 669, 673
(Fam. Ct. 1993) (noting that the purpose of the juvenile justice system is
rehabilitative, in part); In re Steven E.H., 124 Misc. 2d 385, 388, 477 N.Y.S.2d
563, 565 (Fam. Ct. 1984) (stating that the essential purpose of the family court
is rehabilitative, even though the court is mandated to consider both the needs
of the juvenile and the protection of the community); In re Coleman, 117 Misc.
2d 1061, 1065, 459 N.Y.S.2d 711, 714 (Fam. Ct. 1983) (noting that the primary
intent behind juvenile justice proceedings is rehabilitative, not punitive); People
v. Young, 99 Misc. 2d 328, 330, 416 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (Fam. Ct. 1979) (noting
that rehabilitation of the child is the court's first consideration).
102 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-7A-5.
103 Id. § 26-7A-6 (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court of South Dakota rectified the apparent
statutory conflict by declaring "[w]here conflicting statutes appear,
it is the responsibility of the court to give reasonable construction
to both, and to give effect, if possible, to all provisions under
consideration, construing them together to make them harmonious
and workable."'10 4 The court refused to consider in isolation the
statute requiring the state to look only to the best interests of the
child because "juvenile proceedings have never been conducted in
a vacuum, free from the interests of the state."' ' The court
further stated that "[i]t cannot be imagined that the legislature, in
rewriting the juvenile laws in 1991, intended that the interests of
the child only would be considered."'0 6 Therefore, the intent of
the South Dakota juvenile justice system can safely be character-
ized by the dual purpose set forth in the latter statute.
Even where a state expounds rehabilitation as its primary goal
for its juvenile justice system, case law within that state may speak
to the contrary. For example, the primary purpose of the Ohio
Juvenile Court is "[t]o provide for the care, protection, and mental
and physical development of children ... [and] [t]o protect the
public interest in removing the consequences of criminal behavior
and the taint of criminality from children committing delinquent
acts and to substitute therefor a program of supervision, care, and
rehabilitation.' 1 7 Despite the rehabilitative goal the legislature
sought to achieve, the court of common pleas transferred a juvenile,
deemed amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system,
for adjudication as an adult based on the nature of the offense and
a desire to protect the public.'08 The court noted that "[t]he
104 State v. Harris, 494 N.W.2d 619, 622 (S.D. 1993) (citing Meyerink v.
Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 391 N.W.2d 180, 183-84 (S.D. 1986)).
"05 Id. at 623. The Harris court held that the lower court did not err when
it considered the interests of the state in conducting the transfer hearing. Id.
106 id.
107 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01(A)-(B).
'0' In re Snitzky, 657 N.E.2d 1379, 1385-86 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1995). The court
found that Wayne, the defendant, has achieved superior grades throughout his
educational career, has worked to contribute to his educational expenses, did not
have a criminal record prior to the occasion at bar, hails from a supportive and
stable family, and thus, is a proper candidate for rehabilitation in the juvenile
court system. Id. at 1380 & n. 1. Unfortunately, the court accorded more weight
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eventual solution to juvenile crime will only be forged in a
continuing dialogue between the court, the legislature, and the
people of Ohio."10 9 Unfortunately, the court did not heed its own
advice and acted contrary to the applicable statute."' The differ-
ence in opinion between the state court and the state legislature as
to the goals of the juvenile justice system in Ohio provides support
for the general premise of this Note that juvenile justice preambles
are fundamentally comprised of statutory rhetoric.
The divergence between statutory goals and case law on
juvenile justice is rectified, at times, by amendments to the
statutory preamble. For example, the former statutory goal of the
Idaho legislature was to promote the rehabilitation of children in
conflict with the law." The present, and less rehabilitative,
statutory goal of the Idaho juvenile justice system proves to be
more consistent with case law.112 Approximately one month after
the effective dates of the Youth Rehabilitation Act expired," 3 the
Idaho Court of Appeals immediately deferred to the state's newly
amended stance as protector of society by affirming the twenty-five
years to life sentence, as an adult, of a fourteen-year-old juvenile
to the seriousness of the offense allegedly committed, murder, and transferred
Wayne for prosecution as an adult based on notions of public safety. Id. at 1386.
109 Id. at 1380.
110 Contrary to his order transferring the alleged juvenile offender for
prosecution as an adult in Snitzky, Judge Kenneth A. Rocco stated:
Ultimately, the question of how to respond to violent juvenile crime is
one of the most important issues facing our society. It is not just the
youth who benefits from remaining in juvenile court. The juvenile
offender who is committed to an adult penal institution is likely to
emerge with few skills and little education, and no experience in living
a responsible, law-abiding life. Indeed, such a youth is likely to return
to society a more proficient criminal.
Id. at 1381-82.
. See IDAHO CODE § 16-1801 (prior to 1996 amendment, redesignated as
IDAHO CODE § 20-501).
112 See IDAHO CODE § 20-501; see also supra notes 34-38 and accompanying
text (discussing the shift away from rehabilitation exemplified by the Idaho
Juvenile Corrections Act).
113 IDAHO CODE § 16-1801 (effective until Oct. 1, 1995).
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for murder. "4 The court acknowledged that "the best interests of
the child is not one of the goals of sentencing to be considered
when a juvenile is sentenced as an adult. . . ."" Consistent with
its newly amended statutory purpose, and in direct abrogation of its
former legislative intent, the court found that the goals of deter-
rence and punishment trumped any attempts at rehabilitating this
child." 6 The Idaho legislature and the Idaho courts, therefore,
appear to be working in conjunction to avoid espousing statutory
rhetoric.
III. DRAWING PURPOSES FROM JUDICIAL WAIVER AND
TRANSFER STATUTES
Public astonishment over the "tender age" of violent juvenile
offenders and over the "brutality of their offenses" fuels demands
by lobbyists that the punitive adult criminal justice system try more
"4 State v. Moore, 906 P.2d 150, 152 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995). On the night
of January 20, 1994, 14-year-old Bobby Moore and two friends stole a car and
drove to New Plymouth, Idaho to see a girlfriend. Id. The three boys parked the
car in front of the girlfriend's high school and decided to wait until morning to
talk to her when she arrived at school. Id. A police officer noticed the car parked
on school grounds, approached the car and asked Bobby Moore for the vehicle
license and registration. Id. After the police officer radioed a dispatcher and
discovered that the car was stolen, Bobby Moore shot the police officer because
he feared that he would be arrested. Id. The police officer died, and sub-
sequently, Bobby Moore was convicted as an adult of first-degree murder and
sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. Id.
"s Id. at 155.
16 Id. The court further sought to justify its punitive approach to juvenile
crime by stating:
The fashioning of sentences for offenders who are as young as Bobby
Moore, but who have committed grievous crimes, is among the most
difficult tasks facing any court. For a judge charged with this
responsibility, there arises a natural and humane concern to attempt to
salvage the life of one so young. Competing with this concern,
however, is the obligation to protect society from dangerous criminals,
to assure that heinous crimes are adequately punished, and to deter
such conduct.
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juvenile cases." 7 In response to perceived public outrage, politi-
cians have implemented major punitive reforms."' In addition to
the judicial treatment of each state's juvenile justice laws, analysis
of other statutory provisions, such as judicial waiver and transfer
1,7 LaVelle, supra note 42, at 85. Get-tough advocates are pushing the
nation's criminal justice system to lock up more juveniles and to try more of
them as adults as a response to public fears created by the increased publicity of
violent juvenile crimes. Sherman, supra note 14, ht 1.
When Illinois created the first juvenile justice system at the turn of the
century, the notion of transferring a juvenile offender to the adult court system
was contrary to the entire concept of a separate juvenile court system. Legisla-
tors, therefore, did not draft such a transfer provision. See Juvenile Court Act
§ 21, 1899 Ill. Laws 131, 137 (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 705, para.
405/1-2). As a result, the juvenile court was given broad discretion to deal with
problem children. Such discretion was based on the belief that juveniles are less
culpable for their actions than adults and that child offenders are more amenable
to treatment than adult offenders. Donna Hamparian, Violent Juvenile Offenders,
in FROM CHILDREN TO CITIZENS, supra note 1, at 128, 128. According to the
Supreme Court, "[olur society recognizes that juveniles in general are in the
earlier stages of their emotional growth ... and that their value systems have not
yet been clearly identified or firmly adopted." Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,
265-66 (1984) (quoting People v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 687 (1976)).
Therefore, choosing to rehabilitate juvenile offenders may be a wise decision as
a matter of public policy. See Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir.
1977). Thus, the juvenile court was less concerned with proving guilt than it was
with providing treatment to address the needs of the juveniles. See Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966). Unlike today, the process of
administering treatment was not determinate upon the seriousness of the offense
committed. Hamparian, supra, at 128.
11 For example, several states have lowered the age at which children can
be tried as adults. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.020 (1996) (age of transfer
reduced from 16 to 14); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (1995) (age of transfer
reduced from 14 to 13); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (West 1996) (age of
transfer reduced from 15 to 14); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10 (Supp. 1996) (age of
transfer reduced from 16 to 14). In response to the states' shift towards
punishment of juvenile offenders in the adult penal system, Barry Krisberg,
president of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency in San Francisco,
California, stated that "the public is trying to lower the age of adulthood, rather
than see what is happening as a failure of society." Fox Butterfield, States
Revamping Laws on Juveniles as Felonies Soar, N.Y. TiMEs, May 12, 1996, at
A1.
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provisions," 9 also illuminate the states' actual statutory goals. 20
Relinquishing juvenile court jurisdiction symbolizes a choice
between sentencing the child in a nominal rehabilitative juvenile
court system or in a punitive adult criminal court system.1
21
119 Judicial waiver and transfer provisions allow for the transfer of certain
juvenile offenders, usually those who commit serious and violent crimes, to the
adult criminal court system for adjudication as an adult. SIEGEL & SENNA, supra
note 1, at 383. Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia already have
judicial waiver processes that allow juvenile court judges to transfer juveniles to
the adult criminal court based upon a judicial determination that the child is not
amenable to rehabilitation. See OJJDP REPORT, supra note 14, at 86; see also
Butterfield, supra note 118, at Al (noting that "almost all 50 states have
overhauled their laws in the past two years, allowing more youths to be tried as
adults"). Twenty-six states have enacted legislation that excludes certainjuveniles
from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and originates jurisdiction in the adult
criminal justice system based on the offense committed. See OJJDP REPORT,
supra note 14, at 89; see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 305(A)(1) (West 1995)
(vesting jurisdiction in the adult criminal court where a child is at least 15-years-
old and is indicted for murder, aggravated rape or kidnapping); MiSS. CODE
ANN. §§ 43-21-151(1)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994) (originating jurisdiction in the adult
criminal court for capital crimes and felonies committed with a firearm); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355(e) (1982) (requiring transfer for charges of murder).
Not surprisingly, there is much variation from state to state on the percentage of
juveniles arrested for violent crimes that are handled by the adult court as
opposed to the juvenile court. Hamparian, supra note 117, at 133.
20 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4701 to -4728 (1995) (Kansas
Sentencing Guidelines Act). The statutory goal of the Kansas Juvenile Offenders
Code is to provide each juvenile with the "care, custody guidance, control and
discipline, preferably in the juvenile's own home, as will best serve the juvenile's
rehabilitation and the protection of society." Id. § 38-1601 (emphasis added).
However, despite its enumerated dual statutory goal, the Kansas legislature has
spoken as to its true policy towards juvenile justice in the enactment of the
Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act ("KSGA"). Id. §§ 21-4701 to -4728. In part,
the KSGA serves to punish juvenile offenders like adult offenders. See id. § 21-
4710. Thus, subsequent statutory provisions reveal that the protection of society,
through the punishment of children, is the dominant juvenile justice goal in
Kansas; relegating its goal of rehabilitation of juvenile offenders to little more
than mere statutory rhetoric. See generally William T. Stetzer, Note, The Worst
of Both Worlds: How the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Have Abandoned
Juveniles in the Name of "Justice, "35 WASHBURN L.J. 308 (1996).
2' See generally Feld, supra note 4, at 701. The classical distinction between
the juvenile justice system and the adult criminal justice system is that the former
emphasizes the rehabilitation of offenders, whereas the latter emphasizes the
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Despite differences in form, all provisions that compel a juvenile
to the jurisdiction of the adult criminal justice system are, to a
degree, punitive.
Legislation allowing a juvenile court to waive jurisdiction or
transfer a child to the adult criminal justice system based on a
judicial determination of whether the child is "amenable to
treatment" or whether the child is a threat to public safety "impli-
cates some of the most fundamental and difficult issues of penal
policy and juvenile jurisprudence."'' 2 2 Such legislation
assumes that effective treatment programs exist for serious
or chronic young offenders, that classification systems exist
to differentiate some youths' treatment potentials or
dangerousness, and that.., juvenile court judges possess
valid and reliable diagnostic tools with which to determine
the appropriate disposition for a particular youth ...
Couching judicial waiver decisions in terms of amenability
to treatment or dangerousness effectively grants juvenile
court judges broad, standardless discretion. . . . The
addition of long lists of substantive factors . . .does not
provide objective guidance to structure discretion ...
Indeed, lists of amorphous and contradictory factors
reinforce juvenile court judges' discretion and allow them
selectively to emphasize one element or another to justify
any decision.1
23
deterrence, punishment and social control of offenders. SIEGEL & SENNA, supra
note 1, at 383. Therefore, allies of the transfer process assert that children who
commit serious offenses cannot be rehabilitated and should consequently be
disposed of by the adult criminal court system. SIEGEL & SENNA, supra note 1,
at 383.
122 Feld, supra note 14, at 1007.
123 Feld, supra note 14, at 1007-08. In Kent v. United States, the Supreme
Court listed factors a juvenile court should consider in determining whether to
waive jurisdiction or transfer a juvenile to the adult criminal justice system. 3 83
U.S. 541, 565 (1966).
The determinative factors which will be considered by the Judge in
deciding whether the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over such offenses
will be waived are the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and
whether the protection of the community requires waiver.
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Accordingly, the vague and contradictory factors enumerated in
most judicial transfer statutes are congruous to the preambles of the
juvenile justice laws that contain competing statutory interests. In
addition, these competing interests merely serve as an exhaustive
justification for judicial and legislative choices as to the type of
dispositional forum a juvenile offender will confront: punitive or
rehabilitative.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against
property, greater weight being given to offenses against
persons especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is
evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return
an indictment ....
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense
in one court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged
offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in the
[adult court].
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined
by consideration of his home, environmental situation,
emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including
previous contacts with ... law enforcement agencies,
juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of
probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile
institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he
is found to have committed the alleged offense) by the use
of procedures, services and facilities currently available to
the Juvenile Court.
It will be the responsibility of any officer of the Court's staff assigned
to make the investigation of any complaint in which waiver of
jurisdiction is being considered to develop fully all available informa-
tion which may bear upon the criteria and factors set forth above.
Although not all such factors will be involved in an individual case,
the Judge will consider the relevant factors in a specific case before
reaching a conclusion to waive juvenile jurisdiction and transfer the
case . . . for trial under the adult procedures ....
Id. at 566-68.
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One of the factors Michigan courts must consider in determin-
ing whether to waive a juvenile for adjudication as an adult is
"whether the juvenile is more likely to be rehabilitated by the
services and facilities available in adult programs and procedures
than in juvenile programs and procedures.' '124 This statement
assumes that a child can be rehabilitated in the adult penal
system.2 5 To the contrary, the decision to waive a juvenile to the
adult criminal justice system cannot be justified as being consistent
with the rehabilitative philosophy underlying the juvenile justice
system as a whole because "[i]n reality, the decision to waive
juvenile court jurisdiction is not a decision to rehabilitate, but,
rather, a decision to punish the juvenile upon conviction.' 26
124 MICH. CT. R. 5.950(B)(2)(c)(v); see MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.4(4)(e).
2'5 According to the Supreme Court of Michigan, "a clear purpose of the
[waiver statute] is to determine whether a juvenile is amenable to treatment in
the juvenile justice system." People v. Hana, 504 N.W.2d 166, 177 n.64 (Mich.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1120 (1994). The court further elaboratesthat if the
child is found not amenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system, then "it
is determined that the adult system is better equipped to rehabilitate; the
determination is not to inflict a more severe punishment." Id.
126 Id. at 178-79 (Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting). Certification of a juvenile
offender to an adult court has been characterized by the Supreme Court of
California as "'the worst punishment the juvenile system is empowered to
inflict."' Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 693 P.2d 789, 795 (Cal. 1985) (citation
omitted). The outcome of a waiver or transfer proceeding usually means the
difference between a limited period of confinement in a treatment setting and a
lengthy term of incarceration in a punitive setting. Commonwealth v. Wayne,
606 N.E.2d 1323, 1330 (Mass. 1993).
Supporting the contention that waiver of a juvenile to the adult criminal
justice system is not consistent with the rehabilitative ideal, Chief Justice Michael
F. Cavanagh of the Supreme Court of Michigan argued in his dissenting opinion:
To those committed to rehabilitation as a goal of the juvenile justice
system, waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction over any offender seems
nonsensical. As a matter of logic, waiver could only be appropriate
when a better means of rehabilitation-that is, a better process for
removing the juvenile's desire to misbehave-exists in the [adult]
criminal court. As a practical matter, the criminal courts will never
provide a better rehabilitative process than the juvenile court. If
nothing else, the conditions of criminal incarceration guarantee that. So
a waiver theory based on the concept of rehabilitation has but one
premise-there should be no waiver.
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The Massachusetts legislature allowed public pressure to
adversely impact its benevolent justice policy when it amended its
transfer statute to advance the adjudication of serious juvenile
offenders as adults.'27 The legislature enhanced the likelihood of
transfer hearings by requiring that transfer hearings be held
"whenever the commonwealth so requests."'' 28 In addition, the
Hana, 504 N.W.2d at 178 (quoting Whitebread & Batey, The Role of Waiver in
the Juvenile Court: Questions of Philosophy and Function, printed in READINGS
IN PUBLIC POLICY 207, 218 (1981)).
27 Hon. Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is
There Still a Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 57, 70 (1992); see
Task Force on Juvenile Justice, The Massachusetts Juvenile Justice System of the
1990's: Re-Thinking a National Model, 21 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 339, 339 (1995) [hereinafter Task Force] (noting that "escalating
levels of juvenile violence" have forced Massachusetts to compromise its
"laudable focus" of rehabilitation of juvenile offenders by amending its transfer
process). Prior to the retributive shift in the Massachusetts transfer statute, the
1989 version of the transfer statute required that various prerequisites be satisfied
before a juvenile offender may even be subjected to a transfer hearing. See
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 119, § 61 (West 1969 & Supp. 1989) (prior to 1991
version). The 1989 version of the transfer statute provided:
If it is alleged in a complaint. .. that a child (a) who had previously
been committed to the department of youth services as a delinquent
child has committed an offense against a law of the commonwealth
which, if he were an adult, would be punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison; or (b) has committed an offense involving the
infliction or threat of serious bodily harm, and in either case if such
alleged offense was committed while the child was between his
fourteenth and seventeenth birthdays, and if the court enters a written
finding based upon clear and convincing evidence that the child
presents a significant danger to the public as demonstrated by the
nature of the offense charged and the child's past record of delinquent
behavior, if any, and is not amenable to rehabilitation as a juvenile, the
court may, after a transfer hearing held in accordance with such rules
of court as shall be adopted for such purpose, dismiss the complaint.
Id.
128 Martin, supra note 127, at 71; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 61
(Supp. 1991) (prior to 1992 version); see generally Task Force, supra note 127,
at 3 50-54 (setting forth the history and evolution of the Massachusetts juvenile
transfer statute). The Task Force, assembled by the Boston Bar Association to
study the current Massachusetts juvenile justice system, concluded that the state
has not achieved its retributive purpose through the revisions made to its transfer
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legislature also reduced the court's and the prosecutor's discretion
in determining whether or not a transfer hearing should be held by
requiring a transfer hearing in "every case" of certain enumerated
alleged offenses. 29 The Massachusetts legislature further revealed
its proclivity to transfer a serious juvenile offender to the criminal
justice system for adjudication as an adult by creating a "rebuttable
presumption that the child presents a significant danger to the
public and that such child is not amenable to rehabilitation within
the juvenile justice system" where the child committed specifically
enumerated offenses. 3 ° The juvenile charged with a serious
offense such as murder therefore assumes the initial burden of
producing evidence on issues of dangerousness and amenability to
rehabilitation.3' The punitive amendments also grant jurisdiction
statute. Task Force, supra note 127, at 356-57.
The 1991 revised version of the Massachusetts juvenile transfer statute
provides in pertinent part:
The commonwealth may request a transfer hearing whenever it is
alleged in a complaint that a child, who is fourteen years old or older,
has committed an offense against a law of the commonwealth, which,
if he were an adult, would be punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison, and that the offense has allegedly been committed by a child
who had previously been committed to the department of youth
services, or involves the threat or infliction of serious bodily harm. The
court shall hold a transfer hearing whenever the commonwealth so
requests. The court shall order a transfer hearing, in every case in
which the offense alleged is murder in the first or second degree,
manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, or armed robbery that has resulted in
serious bodily injury.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 61 (Supp. 1991).
29 Martin, supra note 127, at 71.
30 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 61 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996)
(current version).
13' Commonwealth v. Wayne W., 606 N.E.2d 1323, 1331 (Mass. 1993).
Additionally, for juveniles alleged to have committed the most serious offenses,
the standard of proof has been lowered from "clear and convincing evidence" to
a "preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 1327.
According to Judge Gordon A. Martin, Jr., the rebuttable presumption serves
as a form of justification for the finder of fact to infer from the offense charged
that the juvenile is not amenable to treatment. Martin, supra note 127, at 79.
Critics, however, believe the amenability to treatment standard is "too vague"
and "too nebulous." Martin, supra note 127, at 84. Judge Martin goes on to
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to the juvenile court to sentence juveniles as young as fourteen who
commit murder to state prison.'32
Not surprisingly, the harsher changes made in the Massachusetts
transfer statute are contradictory to the benevolent statutory purpose
behind its juvenile justice system. Massachusetts declares that its
policy is "to provide the necessary care and protection to insure the
rights of any child to sound health and normal physical, mental,
spiritual and moral development."' 33 Therefore, the Massachusetts
suggest that there is no "rational connection" between the alleged offense and the
conclusion that the child is not amenable to treatment within the juvenile justice
system. See Martin, supra note 127, at 79 (questioning the rebuttable presump-
tion framework).
For example, Tony, a 14-year-old was found unfit for trial as a juvenile
where he was charged with killing a pizza delivery man. Hicks v. Superior
Court, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269 (Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1051
(1996). In attempting to argue that the presumption is irrational, Tony's attorney
used two hypotheticals. Id. at 275 n.15. In the first hypothetical, a minor less
than 16-years-old tortures, rapes and shoots an elderly woman, but the woman
does not die. Id. Charged with attempted murder, torture and rape, the minor in
this hypothetical is not subject to the presumption of unfitness because the
elderly woman did not die. Id. In the second hypothetical, a 14-year-old minor
witnesses her alcoholic father beating her mother and she shoots and kills her
father. Id. The minor in this second hypothetical is charged with murder and is
subject to the presumption of unfitness for juvenile court because her father did
die. Id. In response to these hypotheticals, the court noted that "the presumption
is founded on the notion that the more serious the crime (the taking of a life is
at the top of the list), the more severe the consequences." Id. No longer will the
court view the individual circumstances of the child in its determination to
transfer the child where the child committed certain serious and enumerated
offenses.
132 Where a child has attained the age of 14 and if the adjudication is for
murder in the first degree,
such child shall be committed to a maximum confinement of twenty
years. Such confinement shall be to the custody of the department of
youth services in a secure facility until a maximum age of twenty-one
years and thereafter shall be to the custody of the department of
corrections for the remaining portion of that commitment but in no
case shall the confinement be for less than fifteen years and said child
shall not be eligible for parole ... until said child has served fifteen
years of said confinement.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 72 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996).
133 MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119 § 1.
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transfer statute cannot be justified in light of its statutory policy to
protect children. Massachusetts exemplifies a state with promising
rehabilitative juvenile justice intentions that fall prey to public
pressure and misconceptions about juvenile crime. Unfortunately,
it is the child who must suffer the consequences of this shift away
from rehabilitation to punishment.
Similar to Massachusetts, in California, a juvenile at least
sixteen-years-old charged with an enumerated crime'34 is "pre-
sumed to be not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the
juvenile court law"'35 and the juvenile has the burden to rebut
this presumption at a "fitness hearing."' 3 6 The California statute,
' California's enumerated crimes which give rise to the presumption that
a 16-year-old juvenile is unfit or not amenable to treatment under the juvenile
laws are murder, arson, robbery with a firearm, forcible rape, forcible sodomy,
lewd or lascivious conduct, forcible oral copulation, kidnapping for ransom,
kidnapping for robbery, attempted murder, assault with a firearm, forcible
assault, discharge of a firearm in an occupied building, manufacturing or selling
controlled substances, any violent felony, forcible escape, torture, aggravated
mayhem, carjacking with a firearm and other specified crimes. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 707(b) (West 1984 & Supp. 1996).
"' Id. § 707(c).
136 Id. The purpose of the "fitness hearing" is to determine whether "the
minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court
law." Id. § 707(a).
Effective January 1, 1995, the California statute was amended to allow
minors 14- or 15-years-old at the time of allegedly committing a crime, to be
tried as adults if they too are found not amenable to treatment where the petition
alleges any of the following offenses: murder, robbery with personal use of
firearm, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, forcible oral copulation, forcible foreign
object penetration, kidnapping for ransom, kidnapping for robbery, kidnapping
with bodily harm, kidnapping to commit specified sex offenses, willful discharge
of a firearm from a motor vehicle, personally discharging a firearm into an
inhabited building, specified controlled substances offenses, forcible escape from
a juvenile facility, torture, aggravated mayhem, assault with a firearm, attempted
murder, rape with a firearm, burglary with a firearm, kidnapping with a firearm,
exploding or attempting to explode a destructive device with the intent to commit
murder, kidnapping during carjacking and carjacking with a firearm. Id.
§ 707(d).
There is also a presumption of unfitness applicable to younger minors. A
minor who is 14- or 15-years-old at the time of allegedly committing a crime
"shall be presumed" unfit for trial as a juvenile when the petition alleges murder.
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however, is less arbitrary than the Massachusetts transfer statute
because the "California statute gives clear guidance as to when the
presumption arises and what is needed to overcome it.' 37 For the
juvenile court to find a minor who has committed one of the
enumerated offenses under the California law fit for juvenile law
treatment, the court must recite its findings and its rationale
supported by evidence as to each and every one of the enumerated
amenability criteria. 31 In contrast, the Massachusetts transfer
statute merely sets forth suggested amenability criteria without
requiring the level of adherence to its criteria that California
requires. 139
Id. § 707(e). The minor bears the burden of proof in rebutting the presumption
by showing he or she is amenable to juvenile court treatment based on the five
statutory criteria. Id.; see infra note 138 (listing amenability criteria).
137 Martin, supra note 127, at 78.
138 See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Zaharias M.), 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838
(Ct. App. 1993). In making a fitness determination that a child is "not a fit and
proper subject to be dealt with under juvenile court law," the court may consider
"anyone or a combination" of the following factors:
(1) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.
(2) Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expira-
tion of the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
(3) The minor's previous delinquent history.
(4) Success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor.
(5) The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the
petition to have been committed by the minor.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (emphasis added).
A determination [however] that the minor is a fit and proper subject
to be dealt with under the juvenile court law shall be based on a
finding of amenability after consideration of the criteria set forth
above, and findings thereof recited in the order as to each of the above
criteria that the minor is fit and proper under each and every one of the
above criteria.
Id. § 707(c) (emphasis added).
139 Martin, supra note 127, at 78. Pursuant to the Massachusetts transfer
statute that allows for the trial of certain juveniles as adults,
the court shall ... determine whether the child represents a danger to
the public, and whether the child is amenable to rehabilitation within
the juvenile justice system. In making such determination the court
shall consider, but shall not be limited to, evidence of the nature,
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
In terms of consistency, the California judicial transfer statute
is more harmonious with the purpose statute of its juvenile court
law than is Massachusetts. The purpose of the California juvenile
court system supports instances of judicial waiver to the extent that
its statutory purpose explicitly provides for the "protection and
safety of the public" as one of its primary objectives. 4 ' However,
despite the fact that the California statute seeks to hold its juvenile
offenders accountable for their behavior through punishment, the
"punishment" must be consistent with the rehabilitative goals of the
juvenile court.'4' Furthermore, the California legislature removed
any traditional notions of retribution from the term "punishment"
as used within its juvenile court laws.'42 That California estab-
lished a means by which a child may be tried as an adult is neither
wholly consistent with, nor is it wholly contrary to, its statutory
preamble. The deliberate legislative process behind the California
juvenile justice system, thus, avoids rhetorical reference.
Even more discretionary than the Massachusetts transfer statute
is the New Jersey waiver statute. 143 The New Jersey legislature
created a rebuttable presumption that a juvenile fourteen years of
age or older will be transferred to adult court if probable cause
exists that the juvenile committed either criminal homicide, robbery
in the first degree, sexual assault, kidnapping, arson, possession of
a deadly weapon, drug distribution in a school zone or auto
theft. 144 The statute does not set forth a list of criteria for the
circumstances, and seriousness of the alleged offense; the child's court
and delinquency record; the child's age and maturity; the family,
school and social history of the child; the success or lack of success of
any past treatment efforts of the child; the nature of services available
through the juvenile justice system; the adequate protection of the
public; and the likelihood of rehabilitation of the child.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 61 (emphasis added).
140 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(a).
141 Id. § 202(b).
142 Id. § 202(e).
'43 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-26 (West 1987).
4 Id. § 2A:4A-26(a). The New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice states: "[If
in any case the juvenile can show that the probability of his rehabilitation by the
use of procedures, services and facilities available to the court prior to the
juvenile reaching the age of 19 substantially outweighs the reasons for waiver,
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judge to consider in making the crucial amenability determination.
Rather, the statute simply mandates that the judge consider "the
nature and circumstances of the charge or the prior record of the
juvenile" and the "interests of the public."'4 Despite the rehabili-
tative statutory purposes mandated by the New Jersey Code of
Juvenile Justice,'46 the superior court acknowledged the state's
subtle shift towards a more punitive philosophy by affirming the
waiver of an intoxicated fifteen-year-old who inflicted a knife
injury on a fellow camper to the adult criminal court.4 7 In
attempting to justify such a waiver, notwithstanding the existence
of mitigating circumstances, the court noted that "[d]uring the past
twenty years, a dramatic national increase in juvenile crime has led
to a trend departing from the rehabilitation model ... in favor of
mechanisms which embody 'just desserts' punishment oriented
policies, and which facilitate the transfer of juvenile offenders who
commit serious crimes."'4 Therefore, in light of the statute's
arbitrary transfer provisions, as well as the gradually developing
punitive approach to juvenile justice as evidenced by case law, the
waiver shall not be granted." Id. § 2A:4A-26(a)(3).
145 Id. According to Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas, "Uluvenile court
history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure. ....
Departure from established due process has frequently resulted not in enlightened
procedure but in arbitrariness." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967). Consequently,
a Michigan statute was held unconstitutional because the legislature supplied no
criteria for the transfer of a child to the adult court. See People v. Fields, 199
N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1972).
146 The New Jersey Code of Juvenile Justice states:
This act shall be construed so as to effectuate the following purposes:
a. [T]o provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental
and physical development of juveniles ....
b. Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to
remove from children committing delinquent acts certain
statutory consequences of criminal behavior, and to substitute
therefor an adequate program of supervision, care and
rehabilitation ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-21.
147 In re A.L., 638 A.2d 814, 816 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
148 Id. at 818.
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rehabilitative goals of the New Jersey statute are reduced to
commendable discourse.
149
Within the bounds of this limited analogy, the California
transfer statute fares better than either the Massachusetts or the
New Jersey statute in terms of consistency of purpose. California
appears to create more realistic and consistent statutory goals for its
juvenile justice system than does its sister states. 150 In addition,
14' According to recent amendments to its statutory preamble, New Jersey
confirmed its shift towards a more punitive stance on juvenile justice by adding
the following italicized language:
This act shall be construed so as to effectuate the following purposes:
b. Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to
remove from children committing delinquent acts certain
statutory consequences of criminal behavior, and to substitute
therefor an adequate program of supervision, care and
rehabilitation, and a range of sanctions designed to promote
accountability and protect the public....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-21(b) (emphasis added).
IS' Texas serves as a leading example of a state that pervades its entire
juvenile justice system with unwavering notions of retribution. Consistent with
and in support of its newly amended retributive philosophy, Texas has lowered
the age in which a juvenile offender may be transferred to adult criminal court
from 15- to 14-years-old. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(2)(A). As further
support of its retributive approach, once a juvenile offender has been properly
transferred to criminal court jurisdiction, the criminal court "may not remand the
child to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court." Id. § 54.02(h)(i). A 14-year-old
in Texas found to have engaged in delinquent conduct may be incarcerated in the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, the adult penitentiary, for a period "not
more than 40 years" if the delinquent conduct constitutes a capital felony, a
felony of the first degree or an aggravated controlled substance felony. Id
§ 54.04(d)(3) (commonly referred to as a determinate sentence statute); see id
§ 51.03(a)(1) (West 1996) (stating that delinquent conduct includes conduct that
violates a state law punishable by confinement).
Abiding by its new punitive philosophy, the Texas Court of Appeals
affirmed the transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for adult
offenders, and the 35-year sentence, of a 16-year-old who engaged in delinquent
conduct by committing capital murder. In re J.G., 905 S.W.2d 676, 682-83 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1995). The court justified its decision to essentially discard this juvenile
from ever becoming a productive member of society by stating that "the
legislature enacted the determinate sentence statutes to strike a balance between
the goals of providing for the well-being of the child and protecting the society
from the youthful violent offender." Id. at 680. Unfortunately, the incarceration
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the alternative California approach.5' should find proportionately
fewer juveniles subject to the adult penal system based on the more
structured and objective requirements of its transfer statute.
California defends its rebuttable presumption that an alleged
juvenile offender is not amenable to treatment, and therefore not a
proper candidate for the juvenile justice system, by noting that it
has rejected the harsher approach of other states which require the
automatic transfer of certain juveniles to the adult system.' As
an example, "juvenile offenders"'53 who commit the most serious
crimes of violence in New York are not afforded the initial
protection of the juvenile court and are subject to the original
jurisdiction of the adult criminal justice system.'54 The fact that
such serious juvenile offender cases are initially excluded from the
juvenile justice system does not preclude a referral down to the
of a child for 35 years in the name of punishment does not realistically take into
consideration the well-being of that child. The Texas approach to juvenile justice
may be consistent; unfortunately, it is not the type of consistency that will
benefit its juvenile justice system in the future.
'5 See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (analyzing the alternative
goals prescribed for the juvenile justice system in California).
152 See, e.g., Hicks v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269, 274-75 (Ct. App.
1995) (citing Senate Comm. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 560,
1993-1994 Reg. Sess. (as amended Apr. 21, 1994)). The bill was a reaction to
public anxiety about juvenile crime and violence. Id. The proponents of the bill
and the get-tough era successfully argued that certain juveniles do not belong in
the juvenile court system and need to be dealt with as adults. Id. Therefore,
lowering the age at which a serious juvenile offender may be tried as an adult,
pending the results of a judicial transfer hearing, is a rational response to "the
legitimate public desire to address what is a serious problem." Id.
153 The New York legislature defines "juvenile offender" in its penal law as
a person 13-years-old who is criminally responsible for acts constituting the
following offenses: murder, and a person 14- or 15-years-old who is criminally
responsible for acts constituting murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, arson,
manslaughter, assault, rape, sodomy, burglary, robbery and aggravated sexual
abuse. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(18) (McKinney 1987). However, in reference
to less serious offenses, "a person less than sixteen years old is not criminally
responsible for conduct" and is subject to the jurisdiction of the family court. Id.
§ 30.00(1).
154 See generally RITA KRAMER, AT A TENDER AGE 10-11 (1988).
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family court.' Referrals to the family court, however, are rare
occurrences.1
5 6
Contrary to public opinion, a significant number of juveniles
transferred to adult court, or initially tried there, are being tried for
155 After a motion by a juvenile offender, the supreme court may order the
removal of the action to the family court if the court determines that to do so
would be in the interests of justice or if the court finds one or more of the
following factors: (i) mitigating circumstances that affect the manner in which
the crime was committed; (ii) the extent of the defendant's role in the crime; or
(iii) possible deficiencies in proof of the crime. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC.
§§ 210.43(1)(a)-(b) (McKinney 1993).
In making its decision to remove the juvenile offender to family court, the
court shall consider the following: (a) the seriousness and circumstances of the
offense; (b) the extent of harm caused by the offense; (c) the evidence of guilt,
regardless of admissibility at trial; (d) the history, characterand condition of the
defendant; (e) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence
authorized for the offense; (f) the impact of removal to family court on the
welfare of the community; (g) the impact of removal to the family court on the
confidence of the public in the criminal justice system; (h) the attitude of the
defendant or victim with respect to the motion; and (i) any other relevant fact
indicating that a conviction in the adult penal system would serve no useful
purpose. Id. § 210.43(2). It is important to note that the family court can never
attain jurisdiction of a criminal offender 16-years-old or older. See id.
§ 190.71 (c)(1) (McKinney 1993) (stating that acts performed by individuals over
the age of 16 are criminal acts).
156 The New York Appellate Division, Fourth Department, denied the
removal of a 13-year-old accused of murder holding "this was not one of the
'rare' cases in which removal was warranted" based on the gravity of the
offense, the evidence of guilt, the need for such an act to be punished under the
penal law, and the need for public examination of the proceeding. People v.
Smith, 217 A.D.2d 221, 230-31, 635 N.Y.S.2d 824, 829 (4th Dep't 1995). The
defendant subsequently was sentenced to the maximum term of nine years to life.
Id. The juvenile justice system in New York seems highly punitive because it
allows children as young as 13 years of age to be tried and sentenced as an adult
for certain felonies. However, New York attempts to mitigate the potential
dangers associated with confining children in adult penitentiaries by separating
any alleged juvenile offender under the age of 16 who is detained pending
adjudication as an adult from the adult offenders. See generally N.Y. CODE
CRiM. PROC. § 510.15 (McKinney 1995) (requiring that "no principal under the
age of sixteen . .. shall be detained in any prison, jail, lockup or other place
used for adults convicted of a crime . . . without the approval of the state
division for youth").
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property offenses rather than for offenses against persons.5 7
These children are not necessarily the dangerous threats to personal
safety who sparked public outcry for harsher treatment of juvenile
offenders.' The solution to the problem of how to respond to
the violent juvenile offender is not likely to rest in the adult
criminal justice system.' If the notion that juveniles are more
"amenable" to treatment than adult offenders is generally accepted,
then the likelihood that violent offenders will receive appropriate
services is greater in the juvenile justice system than in the adult
criminal justice system because the resources available to the
juvenile justice system are much greater than those available in its
adult counterpart. 6 ° Additionally, juveniles singled out for adult
'7 Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., America's Children at Risk, 8 CRIM. JUST. 35,
36 (1995).
'5 Id.
'5 See generally Hamparian, supra note 117, at 138 (noting that we have no
valid reason to believe that trying juveniles as adults is likely to prevent future
criminal careers, or that it increases public safety in the long-term).
60 See generally Hamparian, supra note 117, at 138. The likelihood that
juveniles will receive medical, mental health, educational, work training and
reintegration services is much greater in the juvenile justice system. Hamparian,
supra note 117, at 138. Also, there is a greater range of dispositional options
available in the juvenile justice system. Hamparian, supra note 117, at 138.
On the other hand, the conditions of the juvenile justice system must be
monitored as assurance that children are not being mistreated under the guise of
rehabilitation. For example, it was the appalling conditions of confinement that
motivated the Supreme Court in Gault to order minimal procedural safeguards
for juveniles. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967). Since their onset, the punitive
reality of juvenile treatment facilities has contradicted the juvenile courts'
"rhetorical commitment to rehabilitation." Feld, supra note 4, at 715. Historical
studies of progressive juvenile correctional programs provide dismal accounts of
training schools and institutions that were scarcely distinguishable from their
adult penal counterparts. Feld, supra note 4, at 715. The reality for juveniles
confined in many alleged treatment facilities is one of staff and inmate violence,
physical abuse, predatory behavior, degrading work and punitive incarceration.
Feld, supra note 4, at 716 & nn. 136-37. Federal courts have discovered that staff
members have beaten juveniles, injected them with drugs or gas for control
purposes, deprived them of minimally adequate care or individualized treatment,
sexually assaulted them and subjected them to extended solitary confinement.
Some courts have suggested that confinement ofjuveniles without treatment may
constitute "cruel and unusual" punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
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correctional facilities are not likely to succeed upon return to the
community. 161
See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 535 F.2d 864, 867-69 (5th Cir. 1976); Nelson v.
Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 354-60 (5th Cir. 1974); Morgan v. Sprout, 432 F. Supp.
1130, 1136 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 585
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). The Supreme Court has never spoken on the issue. Nonetheless,
a persuasive argument can be made that the conditions of some juvenile
confinement should be scrutinized under Eighth Amendment standards. See
generally Andrew D. Roth, An Examination of Whether Incarcerated Juveniles
are Entitled by the Constitution to Rehabilitative Treatment, 84 MICH. L. REV.
286, 304-05 (1985).
Juvenile institutions' staff may be in need of strict monitoring and intense
training, nevertheless, such facilities are not as harmful to children as adult
prisons. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 65-84 (discussing and
disapproving of the placement of juvenile offenders in adult prisons where the
prevalence of physical and sexual abuse by adult inmates is prevalent); Feld,
supra note 4, at 717 (noting that the prevalence of violence, aggression and
homosexual rape present in juvenile facilities is minimal compared to that of
adult penal institutions). Adult jails have been the least progressive of all
correctional institutions in America. SIEGEL & SENNA, supra note 1, at 371.
Many adult jails are in poor physical condition, are overcrowded, have no
rehabilitation programs, provide little or no medical attention to inmates, are
unsanitary. SIEGEL & SENNA, supra note 1, at 371 (noting also that conditions
in adult prisons make incarceration there cruel and unusual punishment for
juveniles).
This Note advocates adjudicating juveniles in the juvenile court system in
order to guarantee that a child will receive, at least, some level of rehabilitative
treatment during the period of confinement in a juvenile facility. Not only will
the juvenile receive treatment, society would also be protected in the short-term
while the juvenile is confined in the juvenile facility. In addition, society would
be protected in the long-term because the treatment the child receives may reduce
chances of recidivism upon release into society as an adult.
l6' Juveniles who are held in adult facilities are often sexually and physically
abused by adult inmates and staff. See generally BARRY KRISBERG & JAMEs F.
AusTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE 176-77 (1993); Hamparian, supra note
117, at 138. Suicide rates among adolescents in adult prisons are several times
higher than for youths held in juvenile facilities. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra, at
177. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 82-84 (discussing problems related to
jailing children).
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CONCLUSION
Modem day juvenile justice reformers are ever challenged to
build influential and powerful support for progressive child welfare
policies. 62 Despite the statistics to the contrary, children are
under attack from all sides because those in charge of the juvenile
justice system remain captive to public misconceptions about
violent youth.'63 Remiss by shocking cases of violent crimes at
the hands of juveniles, state lawmakers are focusing on crime and
violence in search of a solution, rather than focusing on the unique
circumstances that motivate individual juvenile offenders to engage
in certain anti-social behavior. As a result, several jurisdictions
have explicitly shifted away from juvenile justice systems based on
rehabilitation and moved toward more punitive policies. For other
jurisdictions, the shift away from rehabilitation cannot be masked
by drafting benevolent, yet rhetorical, statutory purposes. However
consummate such draftsmanship may appear, it does not evince the
true policy behind a state's juvenile justice system. Rather, the
actual purpose behind a state's juvenile justice system is evinced by
analysis of both the judicial treatment of its laws and its subsequent
legislative provisions.
Nonetheless, considerations of the best interests of the child still
permeate most areas of the law that affect children, including areas
beyond the scope of this analysis. Throughout virtually all areas of
juvenile law, the welfare and interests of the child have been
balanced against the interests and desire for protection of the
public. It is this contradiction, the state serving as both protector
.62 Contrary to the thesis of this Note, some cynical reformers have proposed
a "write-off' of the current generation of serious juvenile offenders in order to
focus more resources on prevention of juvenile delinquency in the future
generations. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 161, at 187. However, such an
option is equivalent to advocating a form of modem day "genocide." KRISBERG
& AUSTIN, supra note 161, at 187. Saving today's children from a criminal
future is a more realistic and noble goal than forfeiting the future of an entire
segment of the population.
163 See supra Part L.A (describing the public misconception about juvenile
violence).
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and prosecutor of the child, that makes the emerging trends in the
juvenile justice system inconsistent and questionable. Contrasting
statutory goals serve as a means to justify any dispositional decision
a state chooses to apply to its juvenile offenders, whether it be the
rehabilitation or the punishment of such children.
Winning renewed support for the rehabilitative ideal poses a
difficult challenge in the wake of ultra-sensationalized public
frustration and anger over juvenile violence. However, patience and
commitment to children are required to overcome unproductive,
punitive and drove approaches to serious juvenile delinquency.
Unfortunately, there is no single model juvenile justice system for
states to duplicate.'64 The invariably changing juvenile justice
system is largely experimental.' 65 Fortunately for wayward
children, and despite the trend the juvenile courts have taken
towards punishment of such children, rehabilitation and treatment
continue to be at least part of the tangible goals of the varying
juvenile justice systems across America.
'64 Curriden, supra note 4, at 67.
165 Curriden, supra note 4, at 67.
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